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The Theory of Sociology.

BY

FRANKLIN H. GIDDINGS, M. A.

Professor of Sociology

In the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia College.

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PREFACE.

In the following pages I have sketched the theoretical positions that will be more fully described and defended in a work on the Principles of Sociology, which is now well advanced towards completion. I have incorporated portions of two papers previously published, namely, "The Province of Sociology," which appeared in *THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE*, Vol. I, No. I, July, 1890, and "Sociology as a University Study," which appeared in *The Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. VI, No. 4, December, 1891. The fundamental ideas of the theory here offered were presented in the earlier paper.

F. H. G.

BRYN MAWR, PENNSYLVANIA,

May 23, 1894.

THE THEORY OF SOCIOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL IDEA.

No science is at this moment in greater need of theoretical organization than sociology. A rapidly growing body of co-ordinated knowledge is called by this name. An increasing number of earnest thinkers in England, Germany, France, Belgium, Italy and the United States are known as sociologists. Several universities in Europe and in America have introduced courses in sociology. Yet there is no definite agreement among scientific men as to what the word shall be understood to mean.

In some of the university courses it stands for a philosophy of society. In others it denominates a study of the institutions of tribal communities. In yet others it is applied to highly special studies of pauperism, crime and philanthropy. In the literature of sociology, also, an equally varied usage may be found. Special investigators employ the word in senses that are unrecognized by the systematic writers.

It is necessary, therefore, to ask whether sociology can make good its claim to be well-defined, positive science, and whether it is, after all, available as a university discipline. What, in general, is the sociological idea; and what place has it in the program of modern positive science? What, more exactly, is the province and what are the problems of sociology? What are the underlying conceptions and chief propositions of sociological theory? What is the spirit and what are the methods of sociological investigation? In attempting to answer these questions, it will be both logical and convenient to take them up in the order in which they have here been stated.

The word "sociology" was first used by Auguste Comte, in the "*Cours de Philosophie Positive*," as a name for that

part of a positive, or verifiable, philosophy, which should attempt to explain the phenomena of human society. It was exactly equivalent to "social physics," for the task of sociology was to discover the nature, the natural causes, and the natural laws of society, and to banish from history, politics and economics, all appeals to the metaphysical and the supernatural, as they had been banished from astronomy and from chemistry. Comte believed that by following the positive method sociology could become in good measure a science of previsions, forecasting the course of progress before the event.

Since Comte, sociology has been developed mainly by men who have felt the full force of an impulse that, in our day, has revolutionized scientific thinking for all time to come. The evolutionist explanation of the natural world has made its way into every department of knowledge. The law of natural selection and the conception of life as a process of adjustment of the organism to its environment, have become the very core of the biology and the psychology of to-day. It was inevitable that the evolutionary philosophy should be extended to embrace the phenomena of human life. The science that had traced life from protoplasm to man could not stop there. It must take cognizance of the ethnical groups, the natural societies of men, and of all the phenomena that they exhibit, and inquire whether these things also be not products of the universal evolution. Accordingly, we find not only in the earlier writings of Mr. Herbert Spencer, but also in those of Darwin and Haeckel, suggestions of an evolutionist account of social relations. These hints were not of themselves a sociology. For this, other factors, derived directly by induction from social phenomena, were needed.* But they sufficed to show where some of the ground lines of the new science must lie; to reveal some of

* Systematic treatises in which the sociological problem has been approached from the historical side, but in very different ways, are: "*Der Rassenkampf*," by Dr. Ludwig Gumplowicz, Innsbruck, 1883; "*Grundriss der Sociologie*," by the same author, Vienna, 1885, and "*Eléments de Sociologie*," by Viscount Combes de Lestrade, Paris, 1889.

its fundamental conceptions, and to demonstrate that the sociologist must be not only historian, economist and statistician, but biologist and psychologist as well. On evolutionary lines then, and through the labors of evolutionist thinkers, modern sociology has taken shape. It is an interpretation of human society in terms of natural causation. It refuses to look upon humanity as outside of the cosmic process, and a law unto itself. Sociology is an attempt to account for the origin, growth, structure and activities of human society by the operation of physical, vital and psychical causes, working together in a process of evolution.

It is hardly necessary to say that the most important endeavor in this direction is contained in Mr. Spencer's system of "Synthetic Philosophy," but it may be well to observe that most of the writers who have passed judgment on Mr. Spencer's sociological doctrines have failed to inform themselves as to the underlying principles from which his conclusions have been drawn. They have sought his sociological system in those of his books that bear sociological titles, while, in fact, the basal theorems of his sociological thought are scattered throughout the second half of the volume called "First Principles," and must be put together by the reader with some labor. These theorems, taken together, are an interpretation of social changes in terms of those laws of the persistence of force, the direction and rhythm of motion, the integration of matter and the differentiation of form, that, together, make up Mr. Spencer's well-known formula of universal evolution. At bottom this is a physical explanation, and Spencerian sociology in general, whether formulated by Mr. Spencer or by other writers under the influence of his thought, is essentially a physical philosophy of society, notwithstanding its liberal use of biological and psychological data.

But from its origin in the mind of Comte down to the the present moment, the sociological conception has involved a recognition, more or less reluctant perhaps, but unmistakable, of another interpretation which must be

reconciled with the physical explanation. Comte believed that scientifically-trained statesmen could reorganize society and guide its progress. In Spencer the thought becomes partially negative. The statesman cannot make society better by his art, but he can make it indefinitely worse. In Lester F. Ward* the thought has again become wholly positive. Society can convert the natural process of evolution into an artificial process. It can volitionally shape its own destiny. It can become teleologically dynamic.

The detailed attempt to reconcile these two explanations has been made with great ability by Alfred Fouillée in his critical work, "*La Science Sociale Contemporaine*."† Less elaborately it is made by Schäffle in the "*Bau und Leben des sozialen Körpers*,"‡ and by Guillaume De Greef in his "*Introduction à la Sociologie*."§

In truth the physical, or objective, and the volitional, or subjective, interpretations of human society have contended with each other from early times, for, apart from systematic sociology, many essays have been made to account in a rational way for social origins and progress.

Beginning with the "Politics" of Aristotle, we trace through Montesquieu and the physiocrats an objective explanation in terms of race, soil, climate, heredity and historical conditions. Through Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Bentham, Berkeley, Kant and Hegel, we follow a subjective interpretation in terms of human nature, utility, ethical imperatives and ideals. Subjective sociology is a theory of social choices. Very recently, taking the form of a pure theory of utility, it has undergone a remarkable development, begun by Jevons and Walras, and continued by Austrian and American economists, who have contended that the phenomena of motive and choice, and consequently the social activities and relations that are determined by choice, can be formulated not

* "Dynamic Sociology," two vols., New York, 1883, and "The Psychic Factors of Civilization," Boston, 1893.

† Paris, 1885.

‡ Tübingen, 1881.

§ Brussels and Paris, 1886 and 1889.

only scientifically in a qualitative sense, but even mathematically. Therefore it is not strange that objective explanations of society, which have been so long regarded as peculiarly "positive," should be looked upon by many students at the present moment as descriptive merely, and that the utilitarian, subjective interpretation should be thought to be of superior depth and precision.

Is it not evident that a true science of society must recognize impartially the physical and the volitional aspects of the phenomena? Is it not evident that, if we are ever to have a definite, coherent theoretical sociology, we must construct a theory that will unite in no merely artificial way, but logically, as complementary parts of the whole, the objective and the subjective explanations?

Without answering these questions dogmatically, I may say that I expect that further critical and constructive work in sociology will answer them affirmatively. It will be shown that either the objective or the subjective account is hopelessly lame without the other.

The complete theory, I venture to think, will be something like this:

Social aggregates are formed at first by external conditions, such as food supply, temperature and the contact or conflict of individuals or stocks. So far the process is physical.

But presently social aggregation begins to react favorably on the pleasure and on the life-chances of individuals. Individuals become aware of this fact, and the volitional process begins. Thenceforward the associated individuals seek deliberately to extend and to perfect their social relations. Accordingly, individual and social choices become important factors in social causation. Among scores of social relations and activities that are accidentally established, tried, or thought of, some appeal to consciousness as agreeable or desirable, while others arouse antagonism. The associated individuals choose and select, endeavoring to strengthen and perpetuate some relations, to make an end of others.

Now, however, the physical process reappears. Choices have various consequences. Judged broadly, in their bearing on the vigor, development and welfare of the community, choices may be ignorant, foolish and harmful, or enlightened, wise and beneficial. Here, then, is a new and almost limitless field for natural selection to work in. In the struggle for existence, choices, no less than individuals, may or may not survive. The choices and resulting activities and relations that, on the whole and in the long run, are baneful are terminated, perhaps through the extinction of individuals, perhaps through the disappearance of whole societies.

Thus the cycle of social causation begins and ends in the physical process. Intermediate between beginning and completion is the volitional process of artificial selection or of conscious choosing. But this is by no means, as Mr. Ward contends, a substitution of an artificial for a natural process. It is merely an enormous multiplication of the variations on which natural selection finally acts.

Accordingly the sociologist has three main quests. First, he must try to discover the conditions that determine mere aggregation and concourse. Secondly, he must try to discover the law that governs social choices, the law, that is, of the subjective process. Thirdly, he must try to discover also the law that governs the natural selection and survival of choices, the law, that is, of the objective process.

CHAPTER II.

THE PROVINCE OF SOCIOLOGY.

Such, in general, is the sociological idea. Of itself, however, it is not a science. A living science, holding the allegiance of practical investigators, is likely to be something less or something more than an organic part of a philosopher's system of knowledge. Comte invented the word sociology and built up a sociological theory, because he felt that the "philosophie positive" would be but a sorry fragment if left without a body of humanist doctrine to supplement biology. Mr. Spencer, with the results of a later and most brilliant half century of discovery at his command, adopted the word and remoulded the doctrine, because he realized that a complete account of universal evolution must explain the origin and structure of human societies no less than the genesis of species and the integration of star-dust. But the question must now be raised—How much of this doctrine belongs properly within any one science? A social philosophy of Comtist or Spencerian dimensions ought, first of all, to determine its province by defining its relation to other branches of knowledge, and especially to those narrower sciences that have been dividing among themselves a patient and fruitful study of no small portion of observable social phenomena. We ought not to assume, without further analysis, that the natural interpretation of society is the function of one single, all-embracing science. The particular social sciences have not been altogether devoid of the positive character.

One group of such studies, known collectively as the political sciences, includes political economy, the philosophy of law and the theory of the State. Another includes archæology, comparative philology and the comparative study of religions. Does sociology embrace these various departments of investigation? If so, is it anything more than a collective

name for the sum of the social sciences? Assuming that it is more than a collective name, does it set aside the theoretical principles of the special social sciences or does it substitute others for them, or does it adopt and co-ordinate them?

According to the Spencerian conception, political economy, jurisprudence, the theory of the State, and such disciplines as comparative philology are differentiated parts of sociology, and therefore sufficiently distinct though co-ordinated sciences. In the view of Comte they are not true sciences at all. Comte's disparaging notion of political economy is too well known to need quotation. The life of society he conceived as indivisible; he believed that legitimate science could study it only as a whole. It is the Spencerian view that one encounters in modern discussions, yet accompanied more often than not, by plain intimations that only the subdivisions of sociology—the specialized social sciences—are of much concern to serious scholars. Regarded as a whole of which the parts are definitely organized sciences, grown already to such magnitude that the best equipped student can hardly hope to master any one of them in a lifetime, sociology is too vast a subject for practical purposes. One might as well apply to it at once Schopenhauer's epigrammatic description of history—"certainly rational knowledge, but not a science."

Yet the word will not be put by. A writer no sooner resolves that he will not take all social knowledge for his province than he tries to find a substance for the disembodied name. So it turns out that every social philosopher creates a sociology in the image of his professional specialty. To the economist sociology is a penumbral political economy—a scientific outer darkness—for inconvenient problems and obstinate facts that will not live peaceably with well-bred formulas. To the alienist and criminal anthropologist it is a social pathology. To the ethnologist it is that subdivision of his own science which supplements the account of racial traits by a description of social organization.

To the comparative mythologist and student of folklore it is an account of the evolution of culture.

A living science is not created in this way. It grows from a distinct nucleus. It becomes every decade more clearly individuated. It makes for itself a plainly circumscribed field. Its problems are unmistakably different from those of any other department of investigation.

These limitations seem to have been perceived more clearly by some other people than by the sociologists themselves. A suggestive disagreement of opinion between two eminent educators in the university of Brussels has put the matter in the strongest possible light. M. Guillaume De Greef, whose "*Introduction à la Sociologie*" I have found to be on the whole more valuable than any other general work after Mr. Spencer's, made an earnest plea in the preface of his "*Première Partie*," written in 1886, for the creation of chairs and even faculties of sociology, which should impart instruction in accordance with a certain classification of social phenomena that M. De Greef makes very important in his system. Now this classification is one of the all-comprehending schemes. It includes everything, from the husbanding of corn and wine to electioneering contests in the Institute of France. At the opening of the university on October 15, 1888, the rector, M. Van der Rest, took "*La Sociologie*" as the theme of his discourse, which was a keen and exceedingly plain-spoken argument against M. De Greef's views, and a justification of refusal to institute the special chair desired. Sociology was characterized as a badly determined science, that presents no well-defined line of demarcation from the moral and political sciences, and that touches the most varied questions, all of which, nevertheless, are comprised within the limits of the studies of existing chairs.

The rector's own view of sociology was summed up as follows:

I adopt the word but simply as the name of a concept of the human mind. Accepting the sense that has been given to it, I would mean by it the science of social phenomena. But I would add that if we go beyond the domain of abstraction, the science so defined can be

understood in one of two ways only: either it will have for its object a study of men united in society, including all the facts that it can find in social life, disengaging their laws and connecting the social present with the past and the future—in which case the science cannot be constructed, and will be nothing more than the *ensemble* of our political and moral sciences bound together in a chimerical unity; or it will consist only of general views on social progress, and then it seems to me impossible to make out the line of demarcation that separates sociology from a much older science, the philosophy of history.*

We need not accept M. Van der Rest's conclusion that a concrete sociology must be either the *ensemble* of the moral and political sciences or a philosophy of history, but we may agree with him that if it is an indefinite, badly determined thing, it cannot be a university study. Sociology cannot be taught as an organon of the social sciences, nor yet as a mass of unrelated facts left over from other researches.

Clear thinking and a discriminating use of terms will create order from the confusion and establish sociology in its rightful position, where it can no longer encroach on the territory of other sciences nor be crowded out of the field by them. Sociology is a general social science, but a general science is not necessarily a group of sciences. No doubt the word will continue to be used as a short term for the social sciences collectively, and there is no harm in that. Again, in a synthetic philosophy like Mr. Spencer's it can always be used legitimately to denote an explanation of social evolution in broad outlines of abstract truth. But the sociology of the working sociologist, and of the university, will be a definite and concrete body of knowledge that can be presented in the class-room and worked over in the seminarium. These last conditions are crucial for the existence of the science; for when sociology has as distinct a place in the working program of the university as political economy or psychology, its scientific claims will be beyond cavil. But that will be only when educated men have learned to conceive of sociology as distinctly and concretely as they conceive of other sciences. The word must instantly call to

* "*La Sociologie*," Bruxelles, 1888, p. 33.

mind a particular class of phenomena and a definite group of co-ordinated problems.

That such distinct, concrete conceptions will, in time, displace the vague notions now afloat, is beyond reasonable doubt. If we adhere to methods of sound logic, and accept guidance from the history of other sciences, we cannot find it especially difficult to mark off sociology from the special social sciences when once we apply ourselves seriously to the task. Whenever phenomena belonging to a single class, and therefore properly the subject-matter of a single science, are so numerous and complicated that no one investigator can hope to become acquainted with them all, they will be partitioned among many particular sciences; yet there may be a general science of the phenomena in their entirety, as a class, on one condition, namely, the general science must deal with attributes of the class that are common to all of its sub-classes and not with the particular attributes of any sub-class. Such common attributes are elementary. General principles are fundamental. A general science, therefore, is a science of elements and first principles.

Biology affords the most helpful analogy. The word "biology" like "sociology," was proposed by Comte, and he used both the one and the other for like reasons. He believed in a science of life as a whole, as in a science of society as a whole. But "biology," like "sociology," had no vogue until Mr. Spencer took it up. All but the youngest of our scientific men can remember when it began to creep into college and university catalogues. Neither the word nor the idea obtained recognition without a struggle. What was there in biology, the objectors said, that was not already taught as "natural history," or as botany and zoology, or as anatomy and physiology? The reply of the biologists was that the essential phenomena of life—cellular structure, nutrition and waste, growth and reproduction, adaptation to environment, and natural selection—are common to animal and plant; that structure and function are unintelligible

apart from each other; and that the student will therefore get a false or distorted view of his subject unless he is made to see the phenomena of life in their unity as well as in their special phases. He should study botany and zoology, of course, but he should be grounded first in biology, the science of the essential and universal phenomena of life under all its varied forms. This view of the matter won its way by mere inherent truthfulness and good sense. General biology became a working laboratory science, conceived and pursued as a groundwork of more special biological sciences.

The question about sociology is precisely similar and must be answered in the same way. What aspect of social life is not already brought under scrutiny in one or more of the economic, political, or historical courses already provided in well-organized universities? Perhaps none, yet, as the sociologist sees it, this is not the real question. Is society after all a whole? Is social activity continuous? Are there certain essential facts, causes or laws in society, which are common to communities of all kinds, at all times, and which underlie and explain the more special social forms? If we must answer "yes," then these universal truths should be taught. To teach ethnology, the philosophy of history, political economy and the theory of the State, to men who have not learned these first principles of sociology, is like teaching astronomy or thermodynamics to men who have not learned the Newtonian laws of motion. An analysis, then, of the general characteristics of social phenomena and a formulation of the general laws of social evolution, should be made the basis of special study in all departments of social science.

Sociology therefore may be defined as the science of social elements and first principles. It is not the inclusive, but the fundamental social science. It is not the sum of the social sciences, but the groundwork, in which they find a common basis. Its far-reaching principles are the postulates of special sciences, and as such they co-ordinate and bind together

the whole body of social generalizations into a large scientific unity. Not concerned with the detail of social phenomena, sociology is intermediate between the organic sciences on the one hand, and the political and historical sciences on the other. Sociology rests on biology and psychology. The special social sciences rest on sociology.

Yet, after all, have we not overlooked an important possibility? May it not be that our fundamental social science, granting that there is and must be one, is no new and unfamiliar knowledge, but simply one of those older social sciences that we have called special; politics for example, or political economy?

The fundamental social science, whatever it is, must not take for granted social data that admit of scientific explanation by reduction to simpler terms. If either political economy or the theory of the State, or any other social science, builds on assumptions that are, demonstrably, inductions from more elementary social truths, such a science has no claim to logical precedence. Whether its interpretations are objective or subjective in form, the ultimate social science must reduce its subject-matter to primary social phenomena, or to incipient social motives.

So far, then, as the objective interpretation is concerned, neither political economy nor politics can pretend that it goes back to primary facts in the social category.

Both frankly assume without explanation the phenomena of human association.

It is true that systematic works on political economy have usually included discussions of the Malthusian theory of population, and of the hypothesis of the diminishing returns of land, and have thereby put forward partial explanations of the interaction between population and environment. But of these discussions it is to be said, first, that they are not logically parts of political economy proper. For political economy in a strict sense, they are merely data, as many of the text writers long since recognized, the constructive study of which, on their own merits, must fall within sociology, if

such a science is ever elaborated. In the second place, even if we include them in political economy, they do not account for association. Population may increase at any possible rate, and unequal returns from land may distribute the increase unequally, sparsely here and densely there, but people do not therefore necessarily associate. As much as this political economy admits by its procedure, for in all its further discussions—as of co-operation and division of labor, of combination and competition, of exchange and distribution—political economy at once takes the whole social milieu for granted. The benefits flowing from all these things react favorably on association, but they are not the first cause of association. They could not have come into existence before association itself was established.

In the same way, in political science as it has been written, there have been, since Aristotle's day, long prefatory accounts of the origins of human communities, usually mere elaborations of the patriarchal theory. But the greatest step forward that political science has made in recent years, has been its discovery that its province is not co-extensive with the investigation of society, and that the lines of demarcation can be definitely drawn. In his great work on "Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law," Professor Burgess has not only sharply distinguished the government from the State, but for the first time in political philosophy, he has clearly distinguished the State as it is organized in the constitution from the State behind the constitution. "A population speaking a common language and having common ideas as to the fundamental principles of rights and wrongs, and resident upon a territory separated by high mountain ranges or broad bodies of water or by climatic differences from other territory,"* such is the State behind the constitution. It "presents us with the natural basis of a true and permanent political establishment." It is "the womb of constitutions and of revolutions." Political

* "The American Commonwealth," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. I, No. 1, March, 1886, page 13.

science studies the State within the constitution and shows how it expresses its will in acts of government. It inquires how this State within the constitution is created and moulded by the State behind the constitution, but beyond this political science proper does not go. The State behind the constitution, or natural society as we should otherwise call it, is for politics, as for political economy, a datum. The detailed study of its origins and evolution falls within the province of sociology.

If, now, we turn to subjective interpretations, or the explanation of social phenomena in terms of motive, we shall find that here, also, the political and other social sciences assume, to start with, certain premises, which, on further examination, turn out to be sociological truths, neither simple nor elementary.

We will begin, as before, with political economy. Economists have lately gained new insight into the nature of the premises of economic theory. They are no longer content to describe their science as concerned merely about material wealth. The psychological nomenclature that is finding its way so rapidly into current economic discussion is significant chiefly of new points of view and of an important change of perspective. The purely mental phenomena of wants and satisfactions are brought into the foreground. The production of material commodities is no longer placed first in exposition; for it is seen that certain laws of consumption, reigning deep down in human nature, govern the whole process of production and exchange. Many years ago President Walker described consumption as the dynamics of wealth, and we are now just beginning to understand how much the saying may mean. Desires, it is evident, are the motive forces of the economic world. According to their varying numbers, intensities and forms are shaped the outward activities of men and the myriad phases of industry and trade.

But what, then, of the origin of desires themselves? What conditions have determined their evolution, from those

crude, primitive wants of a purely animal existence, that the savage shares with baboons and wild gorillas, up to those of the "good gorilla," as M. Renan has called him, the man of gentle instincts and cultivated tastes? These are interesting questions, but the economist does not answer them. He takes desires as he finds them, save in so far as he finds it necessary, in working out the dynamic phases of his subject, to observe the reactions of economic life itself upon desire. But in general, desires are for him the premises of an intricate deductive scheme, and nothing more.

How is it with the theory of the State? Political science, too, finds its premises in facts of human nature. The motive forces of political life, as of economic life, are the desires of men, but under another aspect—desires no longer individual merely, and no longer a craving for satisfactions that must come for the most part in material forms. They are desires massed and generalized; desires felt simultaneously and continuously by thousands, or even by millions of men, who are by them simultaneously moved to concerted action. They are desires of what we may call the social mind in distinction from the individual mind, and they are chiefly for such ideal things as national power and renown, or conditions of liberty and peace. Transmuted into will, they become the phenomenon of sovereignty—the obedience-compelling power of the State. Political science describes these gigantic forces of the social mind and studies their action; but it no more concerns itself with their geneses than political economy concerns itself with the genesis of individual desires. It simply assumes for every nation a national character, and is content that the political constitution of the State can be scientifically deduced from the character assumed. It takes the fact of sovereignty and builds upon it, and does not speculate how sovereignty came to be, as did Hobbes and Locke and Rousseau. It starts exactly where Aristotle started, with the dictum that man is a political animal, and does not attempt to go farther back.

There is a group of sciences that are concerned with various special phases of the social mind. The foundation of these is comparative philology, which Renan, writing in 1848 of the future of science, with clear vision and happy phrase described as "the *exact science* of things intellectual." On this science have been built the sciences of comparative mythology and comparative religion, and materials are even now accumulating for a science of comparative art. Of all these sciences, as of economics and politics, the postulates, not always distinctly stated but always implied, are human desires ; for aspiration is but desire blending itself with belief and rising into the ideal. Unlike economics and politics, however, these sciences of *Culturgeschichte* do to some extent deal directly with the genesis of the mental states that are their postulates. But they study them only in very special phases and with a narrowly specific purpose. Upon the broad question of the evolution and ultimate causation of desires in general, they have no occasion to enter.

Thus it would appear that there is no one of the recognized social sciences that takes for its peculiar problem the investigation of the origins of those motive forces that are everywhere assumed to account for all that comes to pass in the social life of mankind. Yet though not investigated, nor taken up for patient scientific analysis, these origins are by no means hidden. The manner of their causation is everywhere taken for granted, as if so simple a thing could not possibly be overlooked or stand in need of explanation. Association, comradeship, co-operation, have converted the wild gorilla into the good gorilla and brought it to be that, in the quaint words of Bacon,

there is in man's nature a secret inclination and motion towards love of others, which if it be not spent on some one or a few, doth naturally spend itself towards many, and maketh men become humane and charitable, as it is seen sometimes in friars.

Or to drop the figure—for it is nothing more, since the human progenitor must have been a social and companionable sort of ape, and no gorilla at all—it has been the

rubbing of crude natures together that has made fine natures. It has been the well-nigh infinite multiplication of sensations, experiences, suggestions, due to the prolonged and intimate gregariousness of human hordes in those favorable environments where population could become relatively dense, that has created the human mind and filled it with those innumerable wants that impel to ceaseless effort and tireless questioning of the unknown. That as "iron sharpeneth iron so a man sharpeneth the countenance of his friend," was the earliest and the greatest discovery ever made in sociology.

If the foregoing account is true to logic and fact, no one of the particular social sciences is the primary science of society, either as an objective or as a subjective explanation.

There remains, however, one further possibility. Admitting that political economy as usually defined and taught is a particular social science, logically an off-shoot of sociology, an objector may claim that we have now an abstract or pure economics, preliminary to "political" or "social" economy, and consisting of theories of subjective utility, cost and value, which, so far from being a part or branch of sociology, is logically antecedent to all branches.

This objection is not only inherently plausible, but it may seem to derive support from the claims already conceded in behalf of subjective interpretations in the social sciences generally. If choices are not capricious are they not governed by considerations of utility, and is not subjective utility therefore antecedent logically and developmentally to society? Would not the individual who lived in contact with nature enjoy subjective utility every time he ate his food or lay in the sun, though there were no society? If so, is not the theory of utility precedent to sociology?

Without entering here upon the discussion of the utilitarian theory of choices I am prepared to deny that, as far as choice is determined by subjective utility, it is evolutionally antecedent to association. It can be shown that, apart from association, there could never have been any such thing

as subjective utility. Therefore there is no independent science of utility. The theory of utility is merely a part of theoretical sociology.

In demonstration of these propositions, the first step is to expose a fallacy of definition. A tendency has crept into recent economic writing to use the term subjective utility as if it meant merely any degree of pleasurable feeling, however slight, and meant nothing whatever in addition to pleasure, or in combination with it. If this usage is not abandoned, economists will soon find themselves involved in hopeless difficulties. The pleasure element in subjective utility must be more than infinitesimal. It must be of sufficient magnitude to have importance for consciousness, and to admit of appreciable distinctions of more and less. Besides, pleasure is not the only element. Subjective utility is pleasurable feeling in combination with knowledge that the pleasure is consequent upon an external condition or thing, namely, an objective utility.* Unless this intellectual factor is included, the whole theory of utility, which has been constructed with so much labor, falls into ruin, for the theory has always tacitly assumed, as its minor premise, that varying states of feeling are accompanied by some measure of knowledge of the qualitative or quantitative changes in external conditions to which the states of feeling respond.

The next step, therefore, is to show that pleasurable feeling can become voluminous enough to admit of appreciable distinctions of more and less, only under social conditions, and that, in like manner, it is only in social life that the intellectual element can undergo a corresponding evolution.

Let it be supposed that an organism owing nothing to contact or association with its fellows is capable of pleasure and pain. Feeling is none the less dependent on external stimuli. The pleasure of eating is dependent on the objective

* For the technical distinction between subjective and objective utility the reader is referred to the abstract in Vol. VI, Nos. 1 and 2, of the "Publications of the American Economic Association," of a paper read by the author at the Washington meeting of the Association, in December, 1890.

utility, food. Unless the food is varied and abundant, and unless the activity of the organism in seeking and securing food is varied and strenuous, the capacity for pleasure will remain infinitesimal. What will cause its expansion? The one possible reply is, concourse, suggestion and imitation. The individual left to itself would find little prey and develop little skill in capture. A thousand associated individuals will among them find many kinds and sources of supply, and will hit upon many arts of conquest. Through imitation all will rush for the food discovered by each, and all will acquire the skill of each. Thus, though food is the primary objective utility, the secondary one, without which the first could never have been of more than infinitesimal importance for consciousness, is the suggestive conduct of a fellow-creature.

In suggestion and imitation we have, beyond any doubt, those most primary, most elementary, social facts, for which we have been looking. They are the phenomena that differentiate association, in the true or social sense, from mere physical association or concourse. It is because neither political economy nor politics concerns itself with them that, as was said a few paragraphs back, neither of those sciences explains the human association which both are obliged to assume as a datum. No more profound sociological study has yet appeared than M. Tarde's fascinating volume, "*Les Lois d'Imitation*,"* in which imitation is described as the characteristic social bond, antecedent to all mutual aid, division of labor and contract, and is examined in detail, as it appears in the complicated activities of modern civilization.

My immediate contention, however, includes more than this. Not only are suggestion and imitation the primary social facts, they are also, I affirm, among the most elementary phenomena of utility, both objective and subjective. They are precisely the phenomena that raise one factor of subjective utility, namely, pleasurable feeling, to a sufficient magnitude to make it of any importance for consciousness

* Paris, 1890.

or for conduct. Consequently, from their very beginnings, pleasurable feeling within and association without are inseparably bound together. Both are antecedent to true subjective utility, to subjective cost and to subjective value. The subjective interpretation of society in terms of these conceptions cannot possibly take us all the way back to social foundations in analysis, or to social beginnings in time. Social evolution is antecedent to all subjective utility. When, in the course of social evolution subjective utility appears, it enters as a new factor into the process, and is thenceforth antecedent to many of the higher or more complicated social developments. These latter, therefore, but these only, admit of the subjective interpretation in terms of utilitarian theory.

How, then, are subjective utility, cost and value, evolved in the social process? The trouble of looking into this question will be well repaid. We shall get not only a better idea of elementary social phenomena, but a far clearer conception of the conditions on which every mode and degree of utility depends.

Pleasurable feeling, we say, is conditioned by the objective utility, food. But what, then, is food? For the animal world it is neither more nor less than a succession of vanquished organisms, which have been engaged, through their little day, in a life and death struggle with other organisms, and have at last met the conqueror that is to devour and assimilate them. Conflict, conquest and death are the preliminary conditions of utility. Life continues but by devouring life, and from this law there is no deliverance. No more in organic than in inorganic nature can we prevent the ceaseless dissipation of energy and integration of matter which constitutes the universal evolution. When masses of matter, whether lifeless or living, in their endless moving to and fro come within range of each other's influence, the less potent is absorbed by the more potent, or the two become united as one.

For conscious creatures success in the struggle means pleasure, but in the struggle itself there are experiences of

pain, weariness, terror, and perhaps even of physical mutilation. These are elements of that subjective cost by which all subjective utility is conditioned.

Now while there is no escape from the universal conflict, and all our pleasure must be bought with pain, it is possible to change the quantities of both pain and pleasure, and to alter their ratio to each other. The highest conscious organism, man, with an enormously greater capacity for pleasure than any rival possesses, subsists mainly on organisms either devoid of sensation, as vegetation, or comparatively low in the animal scale, and he appropriates them with a minimum of effort. Pleasure admits of indefinite increase, pain of indefinite decrease.

But no merely individual effort or experience could achieve these desirable results. They are social products, consequences of social evolution, which become of ever greater importance as social organization becomes more perfect. The social condition on which they depend is next in generality after imitation, and is that which shapes the majority of positive social relations. Pleasure no less than pain is born of conflict, but the progressive evolution of pleasure and its appreciable increase, both absolute and relative, depend on the progressive limitation and regulation of conquest and absorption by toleration and alliance.

In an exhaustive treatise on the forms and limitations of conflict in human society, "*Les Luites entre Sociétés Humaines*,"* M. J. Novicow has inquired deeply into the mutual reactions of conflict and alliance. He has directed attention to the universality of conflict, and has reminded us that victory always creates subordination, which may vary in degree between the widest extremes. M. Novicow seems not to have perceived the bearing of his observations upon the theory of utility, and he is interested, therefore, chiefly in the relation of conflict and alliance to social grouping. Whatever the degree of subordination resulting from conflict and conquest, some grouping or other is modified.

* Paris, 1893.

If subordination is not pushed to the point of annihilation and absorption, conquest is limited by alliance, and a new corporate individuality is created. Here is the suggestion of an interesting generalization. The higher types of association come into existence only as a partial subordination displaces that which is total. If the *amoeba* had always devoured other *amoebæ* there never would have been poly-cellular organisms. If every horde had massacred all its enemies there never would have been tribe nor city.

This is an important principle in the objective explanation of society. The corresponding subjective principle, which M. Novicow has not formulated, is not of less consequence. Only as the absolute subordination of ruthless conquest is displaced by the mild and partial subordination of alliance, can there be either an absolute or a relative increase of pleasure, progressively and on a large scale. On the other hand, where alliance does limit conquest, as we have now to observe, the absolute and the relative increase of pleasure are assured.

Intermediate between conflict and alliance is a stage that M. Novicow has not mentioned, that of toleration. The struggle for food discloses the fact that creatures of the same kind or species are usually too nearly equal in strength and skill for any large number of them to depend habitually on conquests over their fellows for subsistence. They are forced to tolerate each other and to convert their struggle against one another into a war on lesser creatures.

The necessary consequence is an increase of the pleasure element of subjective utility. No longer warring against each other, their relatively rapid multiplication is assured. They are compelled, therefore, to explore their environment to discover its possibilities and incidentally to perfect their adjustment to a wider range of conditions. Two consequences, among others, follow: First, the larger experience in food-getting and the greater variety of food, make the food supply more certain. The pains of privation will be less often felt. Secondly, beyond certain limits varied food affords more

pleasure, quantity for quantity, than food of one kind. This is merely a corollary of the familiar law of subjective utility, that the pleasure derived from the consumption of successive increments of a given commodity, within the same brief time period, is of decreasing intensity, moving always toward the zero of satiety.

Toleration once established, more positive relations are at any time possible. Besides refraining from aggressions upon one another the individuals of a social group begin to aid each other in active ways. They unite to defend each other against enemies. They co-operate in procuring and preparing food and in finding and making shelter. Antagonism and struggle, first checked by toleration, have now been succeeded by alliance. The possibilities of pleasure are enormously increased, for alliance is an auxiliary objective utility of immense power. It makes possible conquests over nature and lower organisms that would be wholly impossible by individual effort.

It is probable that all modes of alliance begin accidentally and unconsciously. By mere chance, perhaps, simple forms of co-operation are hit upon, and perhaps by natural selection and survival the creatures which thus do aid each other, even without consciously formulated plan, get ahead of others which do not even fortuitously combine.

But by this time conscious planning has become possible. True subjective utility has now at last come into existence, and so has true subjective cost. Pleasure and pain have become sufficient in magnitude to admit of appreciable distinctions of more and less. A great variety of experiences has developed also the intellectual factor, which is pre-eminently a product of social life, for attention, memory and judgment are developed mainly by observation and imitation of fellow creatures. Pleasure, therefore, has become definitely associated in consciousness with the perception of external conditions on which it depends. The feeling and the perception together are subjective utility. Pain has become associated in like manner with a perception of other

external conditions and with a perception of its relation to pleasure. This feeling and these perceptions together are subjective cost.

When subjective utility and subjective cost have become well established phenomena of consciousness, and when intellectual development, consequent upon association, has gone far enough to render possible rather complex comparisons of quantities, another economic idea, that of subjective value, can emerge. By no possibility can it appear sooner. More absurd even than the identification of subjective utility with mere pleasure has been the identification of subjective value with pleasure. Subjective value is a highly complex notion.

Only the briefest account of it can be given here.* When a variety of objective utilities has been attained, and a range of choice is thereby presented to each individual consciousness, a comparison of utilities with one another, and with their respective costs, is made. Utilities and costs are pictured in imagination before they are actually experienced, and different judgments are formed about them. The effective utilities, in particular, are estimated. By these are meant the relative capabilities of like kinds and quantities of commodity to afford satisfaction under varying conditions of want. The effective utility of a ton of coal is not the same in July as in February. For comparative judgments or estimations of effective utilities we use the term valuations. Subjective value is an estimate of an effective utility that is still prospective. It results from a comparison of different utilities and different costs.

Such are the origins of subjective utility, cost and value. They are social products. We can, if we choose, study them as pure abstractions, ignoring their sociological antecedents. But we cannot set up a pure science of utility and say that it is logically antecedent to a science of society.

* For the technical presentation of this subject, see an abstract of a paper by the author, read before the American Economic Association at Chautauqua, August, 1892. "Publications of the American Economic Association," Vol. VIII, No. 1.

Neither can we hope by studying utility as an abstraction merely, to arrive at particularly fruitful conclusions. Utility no more exists apart from society than vitality apart from living matter. The attempt to study utility independently has been like the attempt of mediæval physiologists to study vitality as a principle or entity.*

On the other hand, the theory of utility, with its concrete affiliations, is not one of the particular social sciences. It is antecedent to them all. It is not only the basis of modern political economy; long before its economic importance was perceived it was made by Bentham the basis of political theory and of jurisprudence. Just in so far as politics and jurisprudence are analytical and deductive, they derive their principles from the theory of utility.

The theory of utility therefore is not an independent science. It is an integral part of sociology.

Nor can any other science or subdivision of science that concerns itself with social phenomena establish against sociology a better claim to precedence. No investigation within these fields can be more fundamental than a study of conflict and imitation, toleration and alliance, in their relations to utility and value and to each other. Dealing with these subjects, sociology has the best possible right to describe itself as the science of social elements and first principles.

It may be well to indicate briefly how, if this view of sociology is accepted, the sciences of political economy, jurisprudence and politics, at once assume definite relations toward one another as complementary parts of that detailed study of society in its advanced evolution, upon which sociology does not enter.

When alliances and subjective values have emerged in conscious experience, the individual has begun to react purposively upon his environment. But, also, by this time the communication of abstract ideas through speech has begun.

* For an able defence of a different doctrine from that which I have been presenting in the foregoing pages, the reader should consult "The Failure of Biologic Sociology," by Professor Simon N. Patten in the ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, of May, 1894, Vol. IV, p. 919.

The language of imitative signs has developed into conventionalized sounds, conveying thought as well as feeling.* Ideas and purposes may now be consciously shared by many individuals simultaneously. Knowledge may be communicated to an entire community, and handed down from one generation to another as tradition. The community as a whole may consciously direct its common conduct. It may exercise a common will.

Among the concerns that will engross attention, individual and collective, and which will call forth consciously purposive action, will be, obviously, the objective conditions of utility, as effort and food; the practice and rules of toleration; and the possibilities of alliance on a large scale, with obedience-compelling power, for protection against enemies without and violence within.

It is with these three classes of interests, respectively, that the sciences of political economy, jurisprudence and politics have to do. Political economy ought not to trouble itself about the social and psychical beginnings of utility. The study of these falls within sociology. Political economy should limit itself to a scientific examination of the conscious calculation and pursuit of utility through the development and use of objective means, within the conditions set by social organization. Jurisprudence has no occasion to inquire into the origins of toleration. Sociology will do that. Jurisprudence should study the conscious development and formulation of toleration in custom and positive law, in rights and sanctions. Politics need not go back to the unconscious primitive forms of alliance. Sociology will investigate them. Politics has a field quite large enough in its study of the conscious application of principles of utility and rules of custom to and through alliance, on a large scale, by the general will, and with obedience-compelling power.

In final delimitation of the province of sociology, it is necessary to show its differentiation from psychology. Whatever

* *Vide Romanes, "Mental Evolution in Man," Chapters I-IX.*

else a society is, it is a phenomenon of conscious association, and the field of sociology is certainly not marked out until we know whether there is any reason in the nature of things for classifying the psychological phenomena of society apart from those of individuals.

Psychology is concerned with associations and dissociations of the elements of conscious personality. How sensations are associated and dissociated in perception; how perceptions are associated and dissociated in imagination and in thought; how thought, feeling and impulse are co-ordinated in that marvelous composite, the individual personality, are problems for psychology to state, and, if it can, to solve. But the phenomena of conscious association do not end with the appearance of individual personality. They are then only engendered. Individual personalities, as units, become the elements of that vastly more extensive and intricate association of man with man and group with group which creates the varied relations of social life. Obviously, the individual and the social phases of consciousness are most intimately blended. The same phenomena, apparently, are the subject-matter of two different sciences.

To some extent undoubtedly they are, and, as every investigator knows, the same thing is true throughout the whole realm of knowledge. But a partial and sufficient distribution can nevertheless be made.

According to accepted views, biology and psychology are studies of life as influenced by environment. In biology we study an adjustment of the physical changes within an organism to external relations that are comparatively few, simple and constant. In psychology we study an adjustment of the conscious changes within an organism to external relations of wide extent in time and space and of the utmost complexity.*

For a time possibly, at the very dawning of consciousness, the environment of sentiency is physical and organic, but not social. At all times, certainly, a great part of the

* Spencer, "Principles of Psychology," Vol. I, Chap. VII, § 54.

outward world to which consciousness must adapt itself, is physical and organic, rather than social. Moreover, while social conditions are complex and variable, physical conditions, comparatively simple, are constant and universal. It is through contact with them that permanent associations of ideas are established, and that the mind arrives at notions of cosmic law. Psychology, accordingly, deals with phenomena that are, on the whole, more general than the phenomena of society, and it is, therefore, as a science, precedent to sociology.

Yet, sooner or later, social environment becomes the immediate environment, a medium lying between consciousness and external nature. Directly adjustment is to society, indirectly, through society, it is to the wider world beyond. Society has become, in short, a special and most important part of the "outward states." More rapidly and thoroughly than any other part of the environment it produces favorable "inward states" in the associated individuals. It creates the capacity for pleasure, the power of abstract thought and of speech, sympathy and the moral nature. Psychology, therefore, in explaining these developments of mind, must take account of sociological phenomena.* But its direct concern is with mental development as such; it studies society only as milieu, whereas sociology, on the contrary, is interested in the development of mind as a product of social activity, as a social function, and as an evolution of social nature.

But now at length mind, social nature, begins to react on society. Conscious that their social relations are their most important means of defence, succor, pleasure and development, individuals endeavor to conserve and perfect them. Society becomes a consciously cherished thing, and to an increasing extent a product of conscious planning. Out of thoughts and feelings grow those forms of association

* George Henry Lewes claimed to be the first psychologist distinctly to recognize and state the part played by the social factor in the evolution of intellect and conscience. See "Problems of Life and Mind," First Series, Vol. I, p. 140, and "The Study of Psychology," p. 71.

that are deliberate or of purpose. More and more, therefore, social activities and relations come to be outward products of inward states.

It is here that we find the broad distinction that, for purposes of scientific investigation, and therefore for a classification of the sciences, we should observe between a study of conscious phenomena that is properly psychological and one that is properly sociological. In both biology and psychology we regard phenomena within the organism as effects, and relations in the environment as causes. The moment we turn to social phenomena we discover that activities within the organism have become conspicuous as causes. They have created a wonderful structure of external relationships, and have even modified the fauna and flora and the surface of the earth within their environment. The progressive adjustment between internal and external relations has become reciprocal. Psychology therefore is the science of mental phenomena as caused, partly by society but largely also by organic and physical relations. Philosophically speaking it is a highly special, differentiated branch of biology. Sociology, in like manner is a special, differentiated branch of psychology. It is the science of mental phenomena as a social product and function, and as a cause reacting on the outer world through its constructive evolution of the social medium.

CHAPTER III.

THE PROBLEMS OF SOCIOLOGY.

We have now to inquire just what particular investigations or problems the student will have to take up as work of detail in sociology if he accepts that conception of the science which has been explained and defended in the foregoing pages. From the mere fact that we can mark the boundaries of sociology so as to distinguish it from other departments of scientific inquiry, it does not follow, necessarily, that within the territory so inclosed we shall find that multitude of logically related subjects of research which make up the content of a complete science. Are the social elements and first principles numerous and intellectually fruitful? Are our would-be inquiries about them tangible, and of the manageable kind?

Any fear that the detail of sociology is either intangible or unmanageable will disappear on examination. Our problems are perfectly definite. Our facts and inquiries are innumerable, they admit of close classification, and a scientific investigation of them will be rewarded with large additions to knowledge.

In sociology, as in psychology and biology, it is impossible to study with profit the general questions of law and cause until we have learned much about the concrete and particular aspects of our subject. Before we generalize we must be familiar with the constituent elements of our phenomena, with the manner of their action, with the forms that they assume in combination, and with the conditions under which the combinations occur. It is good scientific method, therefore, to group our problems as primary and secondary. In the one group we put the questions about social elements, growth and structure; in the other we put the problems of social process, law and cause.

In the primary group there are first of all problems of the social population. These include problems (1) of aggregation, (2) of association, (3) of the social character of the population, (4) of the classes into which population differentiates, and (5) of its co-operative activity or mutual aid.

Conflict modified by toleration and the consequent emergence of utility, presuppose an actual coming together of the individual elements of a social aggregate. So far from being a simple phenomenon, however, concourse depends very strictly upon definite conditions, and it assumes a variety of forms, which are related to each other in curious and intimate ways that are of great significance for social theory. Concourse runs into intercourse, the chief aspect of which is the interchange of thought and feeling by means of language, and the chief consequence of which is the evolution of a nature that is intellectually and morally fitted for social life. The development is very unequally accomplished in different individuals, and we get, accordingly, a number of classes in the population. These are, namely, the productive, including directing and directed workers, and the unproductive, including paupers and criminals. We get also, very unequal capabilities for mutual aid.

Thus the influences that determine the aggregation and the intermingling of population-elements, their mutual modification and resulting characteristics, their differentiation and their co-operative activities, present many interesting points for study, on their own account, and in their relation to other features of the social system.

Next in order come problems of the social consciousness, or social mind, including its content of common memories and ideas, its aspirations and volition. The sociologist will not follow these into the details of archæology, mythology and comparative religion, nor into those of law and institutions, in all of which the social mind finds expression. But he should understand the make-up, genesis and activity of the social mind itself.

Following these, finally, are problems of the social structure. In the various attempts that have been made to organize a systematic sociology, the problems of social structure, or organization, have received the larger share of attention. There are several ambitious works that deal with little else. Much, however, remains to be done, not only in minute examination, but in the broader grouping of parts. Many writers mean by social structure the ethnographic grouping of population into tribes and nations. Others understand by the term the organization of State and church and the innumerable minor associations for particular purposes. Both views are right, within their range, but neither is complete. Social structure includes both ethnographic grouping and purposive organization. What, then, is the essential difference between them; and does the one in any way limit or determine the other?

The answer is that the social mind, acting upon spontaneous, unconscious, or accidental combinations of individuals, evolves two different forms of alliance, which may be called, respectively, the social composition and the social constitution.

By social composition is to be understood a combination of small groups into a larger aggregate, where each of the smaller groups is so far complete as a social organism that, if necessary, it could lead an independent life for a time. Family, clan, tribe and folk, or family, township, commonwealth and nation, are names that stand for both elements and stages in social composition.

By social constitution, on the other hand, is to be understood a differentiation of the social aggregate into mutually dependent classes or organizations, among which there is a division of labor.

The social composition is like the composition of living cells into a large organism. The social constitution is like the differentiation of an organism into specialized tissues and organs.

Aggregation, association, and resulting changes in the character and activity of the population, are the first stage

in a synthesis of social phenomena. The evolution of the social mind is the second stage. The third and fourth stages are the social composition and the social constitution, respectively.

Roughly corresponding to the four stages of synthesis are four stages of sequence.

Most of the forms of concourse, intercourse and mutual aid have their beginnings in animal society. By means of them animal life is developed into its various types. This stage, therefore, may be characterized as zoogenic, and the study of it, as exhibited in animal communities, is zoogenic sociology.

The development of the social mind as self-conscious, and the genesis of a varied tradition, mark the transition from animal to man. It is the anthropogenic stage of association, and its investigation is anthropogenic sociology.

The social mind acting on spontaneous forms of alliance creates the family, the clan and the tribe, later the folk and the nation. This is the ethnogenic stage, and to it corresponds ethnogenic sociology.

Finally, the integration of tribes and petty nations into territorial and national States makes possible a high utilization of resources, a rapid multiplication of population, a wonderful extension of the division of labor, a magnificent development of the social constitution and a democratic evolution of the social mind. This, then, is the demogenic stage of social evolution and its study is demogenic sociology.

Such are the primary sociological problems, which must be thoroughly worked over before the secondary problems, more complex, and in every respect more difficult, can be mastered. Yet the secondary problems have more often than otherwise been attacked first, without the slightest perception of their scientific relation to the sort of inquiries that have just now been outlined. They are more momentous, and involve a relatively large proportion of pure theory. On this account, perhaps, they have received the larger share of attention.

First among them are problems of progress. A survey of social growth and structure will probably have convinced the investigator who has completed it of the reality of social evolution. But whether evolution is in any sense a progress, and, if it is, then in what sense, are questions remaining to be answered. The idea of progress has to be examined. What does the word legitimately mean? If it has a rational meaning, are there any facts and generalizations, disclosed by sociology, that correspond to the idea? If this question, again, is affirmatively answered, we must go on to look into the nature of progress. Can we resolve it into simpler terms and, in so far, explain it?

If in the course of such inquiries we are led to affirm the reality of progress, we shall inevitably find that it involves some continuing change in the magnitude of the psychical factor in society, and of its relative importance, as compared with the physical factor, in the forward social movement. We shall find ourselves, accordingly, obliged next to examine the social process. By this term we must be careful to understand not the successive phases of social growth or evolution, which present primary problems of sociology, but rather the process itself, from which the phases of evolution result. The problems of social process are concerned with successive steps in the interaction of physical and conscious forces. They involve a study of the nature and forms of volitional association, and of its reactions upon social character and activity.

Obviously the sociologist has come by this time to problems of law and cause. The question over which controversy has so long been waged, whether there are any true natural or cosmic laws of social phenomena, cannot be avoided, but it is not to be answered by mere argument about the possibility or impossibility of law in the world of conscious human affairs. It must be met by showing that social laws exist, and by demonstrating their operation. The law of social choices which, I have claimed, is one of the sociologist's main quests, must be formulated, and likewise

the law of social survivals. When this has been done, attention must be given to the further questions of cause. Volition having been recognized as one cause of social changes, the sociologist must decide whether he should regard it as an independent, original cause, or as secondary and derived. He must decide, further, whether or not he finds in physical nature the sole original source of social energy.

After all these studies have been made, and not before, will the sociologist be qualified to deal with those final questions that have been placed so often at the very beginning of sociological exposition. What is a society? Is it an organism? Or is it organic and something more? Is it essentially a physical thing, or is it a complex of psychical relations? Has it a function or purpose, has it an intelligible destiny or end? In answers to questions like these, if answers can be made that will carry weight because derived from a patient examination of all the data and of all possible hypotheses, will be found the true scientific conception of society and, as well, the rational social ideal.

CHAPTER IV.

THE PRIMARY PROBLEMS: SOCIAL GROWTH AND STRUCTURE.

Within that broad grouping of animal species, which is known as geographical distribution, there is a minor grouping of animals into swarms, herds or bands, and of human population into hordes, clans, tribes and nations. It is to such comparatively definite groups that we apply the term society or the term community.

That animals generally as well as men do thus live in aggregations, rather than in separation as isolated individuals or as simple families, may be a consequence of either of two circumstances, or of both together. The band or horde may be made up of those descendants of a single individual, pair, or family, which have not yet separated. Or it may have assembled from many quarters near and far, an aggregation at first of strangers, drawn or driven together by some powerful attraction or pressure. For many centuries the first of these two possibilities found expression in political philosophy in the patriarchal theory. The second might have been made the basis of the doctrine of the social contract, but was not. Neither Hobbes, nor Locke, nor Rousseau seems to have doubted that the "state of nature" in which men were presumed to have lived before political covenants were thought of, was an abiding in propinquity, though not in love, of the descendants of a first father. Nor has social theory in later years been much disposed to question the sufficiency of a genealogical explanation of social origins. This is not remarkable. The tribes and nations of men have commonly accounted for their own beginnings in that way. The myth of the ancient omnipresence of the patriarchal family has been dissolved, to be sure, by the discoveries of Bachofen, Morgan, McLennan and others, but for the purposes of a genealogical account of society, a first ancestress, or a feminine clan, is quite as good as a first father.

Yet the sociologist has but to look about him to see that a community often begins as an aggregation of strangers. The commonwealth of California, for example, does not revere a progenitor, male or female. It has been too hastily assumed that the sort of social genesis which has been witnessed in our Western States since the first great waves of migration swept over the Alleghanies, and been witnessed later in the European colonies of Africa and Australia, is something peculiarly modern. Probably it is on the contrary more ancient than man himself, for it is certainly not peculiar to human communities in contrast to animal bands. The forces that distributed a white population over the Mississippi valley were essentially the same that had been at work for unnumbered ages upon the teeming animal life of its mighty forests and prairies. The pioneer hunters found broad roads through the wilderness, worn by countless generations of bison. At the salt licks they saw the ground about them so trodden by herds of bison, elk, deer and wolves, that "there was not as much grass left as would feed a sheep," and "the game trails were like streets or the beaten roads round a city."* They observed the black and gray squirrels gathering in immense companies to migrate over mountain and river, and saw clouds of pigeons "that hid the sun and broke down the branches on their roosting grounds as if a whirlwind had passed."†

External physical conditions were the causes of social aggregation in these instances, as in the European settlement of this continent. Nor is there reason to doubt that they have been original causes of aggregation since conscious life began in the world. Both animals and men, whether kindred or strangers at the outset, come together and dwell together where the food supply exists. Other physical circumstances of the environment, as temperature and exposure, surface and altitude, always exert an influence not to be overlooked. In that swarming of men westward

* Theodore Roosevelt, "The Winning of the West," Vol. I, p. 156.

† *Ibid.*, p. 123.

which has borne the centre of population from a point east of Baltimore in 1790 to a point midway between Cincinnati and Indianapolis in 1890 there has been no indiscriminate scattering. Certain centres of attraction have dominated the movement. On a magnificent scale it has but repeated what occurred in the Nile valley and in Babylonia at the dawning of civilization. What occurred there, again, was but a refined form of such human concourse as the traveler witnesses in northwestern Australia when a dead whale is cast upon the sea shore and signal fires bring together from every direction the half-starved bands for an unwonted feast.* Finally, the savage congregation, in its turn, has its prototype in the formation of enormous bands of sea creatures, like polycistines, medusas, ctenophores, nautili and molluscs, by the temperature of the water, the direction of the currents, and the abundance of their aliments.†

That the resources and other circumstances of the physical environment must be regarded as the true cause of social aggregation, notwithstanding the scientific place so long held by genealogical relationship, is plainly shown by a single consideration. A bountiful environment may bring together entire strangers or it may hold together a body of kinsmen; but no body of kinsmen, however strong the ties of relationship may be, can hold together and grow into a society, if the physical environment is unfavorable.

The subject may be presented now in another light. An assembling of individuals without regard to blood-relationship, and on account of some pressure or advantage, we may call congregate association. The association of descendants of a single ancestor or family may be called genetic association. Using these convenient terms, we can state without further preliminary an elementary inductive truth of sociology, namely: congregate and genetic association must develop together. Neither form can long be maintained without running into the other.

* Grey, "Explorations in Western and Northwestern Australia," p. 263.

† Espinas, "*Des Sociétés Animales*," p. 461.

Let aggregation have begun in either way, as a concourse of individuals originally strangers, or by the multiplication of descendants of a single family. The energy evolved within the group from its consumption of food will be expended in three chief ways, namely: maintaining the food supply, locomotion, and procreation. The latter two expenditures depend on a surplus of energy above the amount necessary to maintain individual life in a given place. Movement limits association by dispersion and variation. Individuals, families or bands detach themselves from the parent group and form new alliances. The student of sociology should get a firm grasp of this fact, that detachment and migration are as common and as inevitable effects of an increase of animal energy in social groups as are procreation and the increase of numbers. Every group, therefore, loses members that were born within it, and acquires members that were born elsewhere. At the same time, every group that is more than a very brief congregation and in which both sexes are included, is perpetuated in part by its birth-rate. Normally, therefore, a social aggregation is a product of both congregate and genetic association.

We are in sight now of a true conception of natural society. An enlarged family, including no adopted members, is not properly to be called a society. Neither is a temporary association of unrelated individuals. In the true society we may expect to find always a composition of the population, and, at the same time, a self-perpetuating power. The United States has received since 1820, 15,427,657 immigrants, drawn hither from England, Ireland, Scotland, Germany, Norway and Sweden, Italy and other countries, by the life-opportunities that are here offered. The resulting heterogeneity of population is a conspicuous example of what I would call the demotic composition. The same phenomenon of intermixture, though on a smaller scale, has entered into the evolution of every society that has existed. Such a thing as a purely homogeneous population was never known. And yet, by far the larger proportion of our

63,000,000 persons have been born within our territorial limits. By far the greater proportion of them have in their veins some admixture, at least, of the blood of the colonists and of those Europeans who came to America before 1821. In like manner, while there is an increasing mobility of population from State to State, from country to city and from town to town, each local community is perpetuated mainly by its own birth-rate. The same thing is true of other countries. It is true of barbarous and savage tribes and of animal herds. Such self-perpetuation of a society we may call autogeny. A true natural society then has a demotic composition, but it is at the same time autogenous.

So much for the conditions and forms of social aggregation. True association, I have argued, is something more. It is a psychical activity, beginning in suggestion and imitation and developing into mutual sympathy and comprehension. These latter, obviously, could not grow out of anything so purely negative as that self-limitation of conflict which brings about a state of toleration. Neither do they emerge necessarily from mere aggregation. Their beginnings must be sought in relations of activity that are characteristically social and yet so pleasurable that a powerful stimulation of purely individual gratifications would be necessary to overcome the counter attraction of the social excitement.

It is in activities hitherto but little studied that the genesis of social pleasure, and, through social pleasure, of the higher forms of association, is to be understood. When the group, however it has originated, holds together for successive generations, the modes of expenditure of energy are multiplied. In both adults and young, but to a much greater extent in the young, expenditure takes the form of play. Festivity, or the combination of amusement with the gratification of appetite, comes later, and is perhaps enjoyed more often by adults. In play and festivity, which are at first the spontaneous overflow of surplus energies, there come into existence true social forces, products of a social condition,

which, in turn, contribute to the evolution of a higher social condition; which are powerful enough to mould individual nature; which begin to operate on the individual at the most impressionable age, and which continue to act long enough to accomplish permanent results. Play has been the chief educational agency in animal communities. Young birds born and reared within each other's sight and hearing, and many kinds of young mammals, spend literally all their days until maturity in ceaseless frolics, often so ingenious in their forms as to captivate the human beholder. It is in these social pleasures that the social instinct is strengthened, and that the art of living in community is acquired. In like manner, among human beings, it is in the play-day of childhood that social sympathy, a social sense, a social habit, are evolved. Later, periodical festivities and more or less elaborate amusements become important supplementary means of social education. Take out of savage life its feasts and dances, and the remaining social activity would be slight indeed. Our Western settlements became communities when they began to fiddle.* If the heterogeneous masses of population in the tenement house wards of our great cities are ever socially organized, it will be after they have been brought under the power of social pleasure.

Festivity was probably the parent of speech,† as at a later time it was the parent of literature. The most constant elements of festal celebrations are bodily play movements in imitation of actions, rhythmic beating, and some approach to song. Under the mental exaltation of such occasions,

* "A few of the settlers still kept some of the Presbyterian austerity of character as regards amusements; but, as a rule, they were fond of horse-racing, drinking, dancing and fiddling. The corn-shuckings, flax-pullings, log-rollings (when the felled timber was rolled off the clearings), house-raising, maple-sugar-boilings, and the like were scenes of boisterous and light-hearted merriment, to which the whole neighborhood came, for it was accounted an insult if a man was not asked in to help on such occasions, and none but a base churl would refuse his assistance. The backwoods people had to front peril and hardship without stint, and they loved for the moment to leap out of the bounds of their narrow lives and taste the coarse pleasures that are always dear to a strong, simple and primitive race."—Roosevelt, "The Winning of the West," Vol. I, p. 176.

† J. Donovan, "The Festal Origin of Human Speech," *Mind*, October, 1891, p. 499.

if ever, the association of vocal sounds with actions and things would be established and conventionalized into signs, thereby making possible the perfect communication of thought and feeling through which the higher modes of association are maintained.

Social pleasure, then, is the foundation of association in its higher forms, and association, with the aid of the stimulus pleasure, acts on the mental and moral natures of individuals, moulding them into a more perfect adaptation to social life. The social nature regarded as a product of past association and as a cause working in the further development of society should be studied by the sociologist with reference to the following essential traits:

The true social nature is first of all one that has become so far susceptible to suggestion and so far imitative in respect of all matters of material well-being (in which, as was shown in a previous chapter, suggestion and imitation first come into effect) that it will desire and endeavor to live as well, at least, as the average, fairly successful, fairly well-to-do members of the community. The desire to enjoy what others enjoy, and the imitative tendency to act as others act, will together be strong enough to overcome laziness, as much, at least, as it is overcome in the average case, and will lead the individual whose nature is social to follow up his material interest as diligently as most other individuals follow up their interests. This is the basis of what economists call a standard of living. It is the foundation of wealth and of all social as of all individual advancement.

A second trait of the social nature, of course, is a sufficient degree of that tolerance, of which so much has been said already, to restrain the individual from active interference with his fellows in their life-struggle. It is only after the practice of toleration has become confirmed and certain corresponding tastes have been established, that the tolerant nature can be said to exist. The members of the community must have gotten beyond the first discovery that, after the exceptionally weak have been killed off by the strong,

and the exceptionally strong killed off by their own rashness or by a mutual resistance of individuals of average power, further conflict, among individuals nearly equal in strength, is useless. They must have lost the appetite for each other's flesh, and have become satisfied with kinds of food and other material means of life that are sufficiently abundant to meet the requirements of the whole society. Antagonism within the community can disappear only as fast as tastes that are exclusive make way for tastes that can be enjoyed by many, a truth which the sociologist can cordially recommend to those social reformers who expect to make the world better by rearrangements of industry irrespective of human desires. Still other changes in consciousness are necessary before the tolerant nature is perfect. Toleration must be not only endurable but agreeable. There must be a growth of association of presence as an habitual phase of feeling. There must be a feeling of pleasure in the mere presence of a fellow-creature.

Remaining traits of the social nature, quite as essential to social as to individual conduct of an advanced type, are the intellectual powers of attention, generalization, abstract thought and invention, and the moral qualities of love of approbation, sympathy, fortitude, courage, truthfulness and good faith. I shall not take the space here to demonstrate the social origin, or to point out the social functions, of all these qualities and powers. Spencer, in Part VIII, of the "Principles of Psychology," and Lewes in his "Problems of Life and Mind," have presented such demonstrations at length, but no one has ever gone more directly to the heart of the matter than Adam Smith in "The Theory of Moral Sentiments." "As nature teaches the spectators to assume the circumstances of the person principally concerned," wrote Smith, "so she teaches this last in some measure to assume those of the spectators." On these two efforts (that of the spectators to enter into the feelings of the principal and that of the principal to enter into the feelings of the spectators) are founded two sets of virtues, one the soft,

gentle and humane, the other the great, the awful, the respectable—virtues of self-denial and self-government.*

The mental and moral results of association, and certain physical changes which result from social conditions and contribute to social success, are by no means shared equally, however, by all individuals. It is impossible that all should participate equally in improved nutrition, or that all should have an equally good heredity. The processes of selection go on by reason of these differences. Quite as impossible is it that all should share equally in the mental growth and moral modification that takes place. Inequality, therefore, in physical, mental and moral power, and varieties of disposition, are among the inevitable characteristics of a social population.

All such inequalities and variations will be manifested in the relations which the unequally endowed individuals of the same aggregation will maintain toward the facts of subsistence and toward each other. In the same group there will be different standards of living, different degrees of toleration and of mutual good-will, different degrees of ability and, corresponding to these things, different types of character. Individuals of the true social type will exhibit the sort of desires and dispositions that are compatible with an expanding social life; that is to say, a taste for easily appropriate food, a disposition to seek it with system and diligence, and tolerant and sympathetic feelings. They will have also the physical, intellectual and moral ability to live as their social nature prompts. The other types, lacking in some or all of these endowments, will be more or less antisocial, unsocial or defectively social. The social type depends necessarily and naturally upon the original and inexhaustible source of subsistence, namely, the vegetable and animal life of other species. The antisocial and unsocial types are criminal and pauper respectively. By means of theft and beggary they depend on secondary sources of subsistence, namely, the supplies obtained from nature, through

* "The Theory of Moral Sentiments." Third edition, pp. 28 and 30.

diligent industry, by the social part of the population. The defectively social type has the social disposition in a measure, or perhaps in a high degree, but it lacks ability. It would be glad to adapt itself to social conditions, but never fully succeeds in doing so. Accordingly this type, too, is partly or wholly dependent on the secondary sources of subsistence.

Out of these types are developed great population-classes as soon as the secondary source of subsistence is sufficient and permanent, in other words, as soon as the society has surplus food and clothing—in brief, wealth. Animal societies have criminal members. They have also their pauper individuals, following the band in its food quests, but living on the fragments and leavings of the prey or vegetation that the stronger majority capture or discover; but they have no pauper class, as human societies have, because surplus food in the former is too inadequate in amount and the conditions of life in general are too severe for pauper endurance.

As social aggregation begins where natural supplies of food are found, so criminal and pauper aggregation begin and continue where the artificial surplus supply is accumulated. I have already illustrated several phases of social genesis by examples drawn from the settlement of the Western States, and I may as well illustrate this one by another. "The frontier," says Roosevelt, "in spite of the outward uniformity of means and manners is pre-eminently the place of sharp contrasts. The two extremes of society, the strongest, best and most adventurous, and the weakest, most shiftless and vicious, are those which seem naturally to drift to the border. Most of the men who came to the backwoods to hew out homes and rear families were stern, manly and honest; but there was also a large influx of people drawn from the worst immigrants that perhaps ever were brought to America—the mass of convict servants, redemptioners and the like, who formed such an excessively undesirable substratum to the otherwise excellent population of the tide-water regions in Virginia and the Carolinas.

Many of the Southern crackers or poor whites spring from this class, which also in the backwoods gave birth to generations of violent and hardened criminals, and to an even greater number of shiftless, lazy, cowardly cumberers of the earth's surface. They had in many places a permanently bad effect upon the tone of the whole community.

. . . . In the backwoods the lawless led lives of abandoned wickedness; they hated good for good's sake, and did their utmost to destroy it. Where the bad element was large, gangs of horse thieves, highwaymen and other criminals often united with the uncontrollable young men of vicious tastes who were given to gambling, fighting and the like. They then formed half-secret organizations, often of great extent and with wide ramifications, and if they could control a community they established a reign of terror, driving out both ministers and magistrates, and killing without scruple those who interfered with them." *

At the present time the great centres of secondary sources of subsistence are the cities, and it is there that the aggregation of pauper and criminal population is going on most rapidly. From the city of New York there were convicted in the courts during the year ending October 31, 1892, no less than 45,777 criminals and misdemeanants. The same city, with a population, in 1890, of 1,515,301 (as given by the Federal census), relieved in that year through its municipal outdoor poor department, not to mention private charity, 25,212 adults and 1324 children, and provided 8340 families with coal. The same department buried 2042 paupers. The almshouse at Blackwells' island in the course of the year cared for 5337 indoor paupers.

Not all the people relieved by charity in our modern cities and elsewhere are paupers, however. Many of them belong in a third class, developed, with increasing wealth to support it, and an increasing population to recruit it, out of the third type that was mentioned, namely, the defectively social. In animal communities and in a primitive state of human

*Roosevelt, "The Winning of the West," pp. 130-131.

society, the well-meaning but unsuccessful fare no better than the would-be paupers. In modern society they can survive and increase because of an abundance which they can share. Like paupers and criminals, therefore, they naturally congregate in great cities. Their defects are of every imaginable kind, physical, mental and moral, but they may be roughly grouped into three sub-classes, namely: First, those whose ancestors came so little under the discipline of social life, and who themselves have had so little opportunity, that they are nearly destitute of natural or acquired ability to look after their own well-being. They are willing to work, but must always be aided. Second, those who get on fairly well until displaced by some evolutionary change in the social system, but find themselves quite witless and powerless to adapt themselves to a new order of things. Third, those who are unable to endure the strain of emulation to maintain a high standard of living, and, in one or another way, drop out of the contest.

In the study of the genesis of the population-classes we have the key to the scientific arrangement of those most interesting questions that are often spoken of as the problems of practical sociology. Just how the study of crime, pauperism and vice, of poverty, insanity and suicide, could be connected in any logical way with the propositions of theoretical sociology, has been a puzzling question to many students, and sociological writers generally have fallen back upon the familiar expedient of dividing their subject into theoretical and practical, or theoretical and applied, or the science and the art. I confess that I have never had much respect for this expedient. It is the easy device of incomplete or baffled thinking. Some of the facts that a science deals with are more practical than others because our daily lives are in more immediate contact with them; but as knowable facts they admit of explanation; the explanation is a theory, and if we do not see it to be a co-ordinate part of the larger theory of our subject in its entirety, the reason

is that we have not yet fully worked out the logical subordination of its particular theorems. More adequate views of the great issues of practical sociology may be looked for if we can effect a scientific arrangement of the problems. If association necessarily modifies the physical, mental and moral nature, but not in all individuals equally, and if unequal degrees of adjustment to the social conditions of life are therefore inevitable, we have an explanation of the differentiation of the population into classes, with fairly well-marked differences of physical, economic and moral condition. Therefore it may be that in a true theory of social evolution we shall yet find an interpretation that will create a scientific order in the maze of facts of practical sociology.

The criminal, pauper, and non-successful classes that live on the surplus wealth of society, but contribute nothing to it, are collectively an unproductive class. The classes that create wealth directly from nature, and those that, engaged in commercial or professional occupations, draw their subsistence from secondary rather than from primary sources, but add to the wealth of society as much as they take from it, are collectively the productive class. This industrious, self-supporting majority undergoes a further differentiation. Many individuals remain merely passive and tolerant in their relations to each other. They look after their own affairs and attempt nothing more. Others become increasingly conscious of the power that there is in association and develop positive ability for mutual aid or co-operation. Mutual aid at first, whether in animal or in human communities, is an extremely simple and momentary direct-co-operation* of which the fishing bands of pelicans that form a half circle across a bay and drive the fish in-shore, the hunting parties of savages, and the log-rollings, house-raising and corn-huskings of backwoodsmen are equally good examples. Such co-operation becomes in time more perfect through a development of

* For the most interesting contribution to animal sociology ever written, the reader is referred to Prince Krapotkin's articles on "Mutual Aid Among Animals," in the *Nineteenth Century* of September and November, 1890.

co-ordination and subordination. Co-ordination at first is merely the simultaneous performance of like acts in like ways. Like creatures similarly placed are affected by common experiences in like manner and respond in like action. There may be a good degree of harmonious action due to this wholly unconscious co-ordination. A more definite and conscious co-ordination is effected through emulation and imitation. But the co-ordination that admits of a relatively wide extension, under a great variety of forms, is that through leadership, which involves also subordination. The mental and physical inequality already described as the basis of population-classes is the basis also of this form of co-ordination. The inferior naturally defer to the superior, follow their guidance and confer upon them special favors.

The phenomena so far examined in this chapter have been phenomena of the social population. We will go on now to the phenomena of the social mind, the appearance of which is the second great stage in social evolution.

The society in which there is much intercourse and mutual aid presently enters upon a further development which establishes its unity and enables it in a measure to shape its own career. It becomes conscious of itself as a society. A common or group consciousness is evolved. An example of the simplest case in which this phenomenon appears is perhaps the behavior of an animal community when a stranger is introduced into the band. Whether his treatment be good or ill, it is such as to show that the members of the society are well aware that he has not been one of their number.

Social consciousness may have the various phases exhibited by the individual consciousness, ranging from reflex action and common feeling to a reasoned judgment.* It is doubtful if animal societies ever attain to self-consciousness. By social consciousness in any form we do not mean a consciousness distinct from that which appears in individuals, except in so

* For a full discussion of this subject, see De Greef, "*Introduction à la Sociologie*," deuxième partie, Chapters I and XIII.

far as it appears at the same moment in all individuals, or is propagated from one to another through the whole assembly. Acted on by influences that affect all its members in the same way, and under proper stimulation, a whole social group may perform a purely reflex act. Again, a wave of feeling may sweep through the community; or yet again, perceiving the same facts, feeling about them in the same way, and each observing in all his fellows the same outward signs of identical inward states, all the members of a community may come simultaneously to the same judgment. It must be by some such process that bands of hundreds, or perhaps thousands of individual birds, or squirrels, or buffaloes, or horses come together and conduct an orderly migration. In a true social self-consciousness, which probably does not appear earlier than the ethnogenic stage of the evolution of human society, the distinctive peculiarity is that each individual makes his neighbor's consciousness, feeling or judgment an object of his own thought at the same instant that he makes his own feeling or thought such an object, judges the two to be identical, and then acts with a full consciousness that his fellows have come to like conclusions and will act in like ways.

In its social consciousness a community has a living bond of union. The mutual aid and protection of individuals, operating in an unconscious way, are no longer the only means that preserve social cohesion: the community feels and perceives its unity. This feeling must be destroyed before rupture can occur.

But even social consciousness is of course at any instant but a momentary bond. In this respect it is inferior to the bond of mutual aid. It acquires continuity, however, through the development of another phase—the social tradition which, with the active modes of consciousness, makes up the social mind. By tradition results are conserved and handed on. The relations, the ideas and the usages that have sprung up, perhaps accidentally and unconsciously, and have survived thus far because of their intrinsic

usefulness, are carefully formulated, defined and memorized. They become the common mental possession of all individuals.

Tradition differentiates into three great primary forms, namely, the economic, the jural and the political, and from these branch off, later, secondary forms.

The earliest and most fundamental is the tradition of subjective and objective utilities, of costs and values, and of the methods of increasing utilities. There is, of course, no conscious analysis of these things. The tradition is concrete, not abstract. But in the concrete there is a scale of comparative values. Food, shelter, sexual pleasure, ornaments, offspring, are its earliest elements. Then come such things as implements, clothing, gifts, trade, labor, co-operation, methods of producing and using objective utilities. All this tradition has its centre in the family and household, but it extends to relations beyond the household.

Step by step with the utilitarian tradition develops the tradition of toleration.

Toleration and friendly social intercourse are at all times balanced by frequent acts of aggression and revenge within the community. It is by these means that the substantial equilibrium of strength among the individual members of a society is maintained and demonstrated. So aided by intercourse and sanctioned by vengeance, toleration is developed and differentiated into rules of custom which formulate those enjoyments, immunities and opportunities that are habitually permitted and observed without molestation. These collectively are the jural tradition, the tradition, that is, of objective and sanctioned right.

The third differentiation of tradition is the tradition of alliance in its political form.

Alliance as a fact simply presupposes some of the elements of subjective utility and some actual toleration. On the other hand, the traditions of utility and of toleration, as distinguished from their respective phenomena, presuppose actual alliance in simple and perhaps unconscious forms.

But again, the conscious and purposive development of alliance within the community, or its extension, to bring two or more bands, hordes, or tribes into one larger aggregate, presupposes traditions of utility and of toleration.

Alliance in either of these purposive forms, intensive or extensive, is the elementary political fact. It is the germ of all political activity and tradition. Its motive is the desire to strengthen the traditions of utility and of toleration by an obedience-compelling power, and to extend their range or application. The political tradition, therefore, is wrought out of the economic and jural traditions, and in its evolution is closely interwoven with them.

The economic, jural and political traditions are the fundamental and imperative ones. Surplus objective utility, or wealth, when it begins to appear as a consequence of alliance, becomes an efficient cause of new modes of activity, which are conserved in a number of secondary traditions. Strictly speaking all of these activities are differentiations of fundamental utilitarian actions, and the secondary traditions grow out of the primary traditions.

First, out of the activities directly related to the satisfactions of the most elementary wants, of food, sexual pleasure and clothing, grow attempts to adorn, and, with them, the æsthetic tradition. Its chief roots are doubtless in the sexual instincts, as Darwin argues, and the tradition is developed through sexual selection.

Secondly, out of the social pleasures and festivities grow the impulse and the need to express and interchange emotions and ideas. The traditions of spoken and of written language result.

Thirdly, the close observation and interrogation of the natural and animate world, which is stimulated by the quest of food, suggest many crude interpretations of natural phenomena, and these are believed to be intimately connected with success or failure in the practical affairs of life. The world is thought to be peopled with mysterious spirits. The knowledge of these is cherished. [Appealed to for aid in

human affairs, some spirits seem to help, others to be indifferent, or hostile. Through selection the tradition of the friendly spirits becomes more firmly fixed. The alliance which holds together the family, or that which holds together the community is extended by covenant to ally the good spirits to the family or to the community. They become its most important members, its gods. In this way the traditions of animism and of religion are established.

Fourthly, as knowledge increases, the beliefs of earlier times are subjected to rational criticism. The tradition of science and philosophy displaces the tradition of animism, and religion is transformed.

Fifthly, philosophy transforms the ideals and standards of life and conduct, and we get the tradition of ethics.

It is only in a very general way, of course, that the development of tradition corresponds to this serial order. The different modes of tradition act and react on one another. Long before the economic tradition is developed beyond its crude beginnings, the philosophical and ethical traditions, not to mention intermediate ones, must have come into existence.

Of the problems of social structure, properly so-called, or the questions pertaining to social composition and social constitution, I purpose to say but little in these pages. They have been more adequately treated in existing works on sociology than have been some of the other topics that I have here discussed. Moreover, I expect in a larger work to give them full consideration. All that I wish to do now is to emphasize the assertion that, though social composition and constitution have beginnings in unconscious processes of social evolution, they are, properly speaking, creations of the social mind.

Human society truly begins when social consciousness and tradition are so far developed that all social relations exist not only objectively, as physical facts of association, but subjectively also, in the thought, feeling and purpose of the associated individuals. It is this subjective fact that differentiates human from animal communities. For when the

society exists in idea, no less than in physical aggregation, the idea begins to react upon all the objective relations. The social idea, at first only a perception or a conception, becomes an ideal, which the community endeavors to realize. From this time on, the forms of association and of associated activity, determined in part by direct physical causation, are determined also in part by the social mind.

In the earliest and simplest forms of human society the social constitution is not differentiated from the social composition. The group, as a whole, is for some purposes the co-operating body. For other purposes the co-operating body is some component group. There is no division of labor which is wholly irrespective of the composition of self-sufficing, self-perpetuating social groups, like the family and the horde. At a later time the social constitution is seen to be partially differentiated within itself and slowly undergoing further differentiation from the social composition.

Therefore, through a long succession of periods, the action of the social mind upon social structure is primarily and chiefly a moulding of the social composition. Or, when it acts directly upon the social constitution, it is at the same time still modifying the social composition, in important ways and to a great degree. Working conjointly with unconscious forces, it is creating definite forms of the family, the tribe, and the nation. Only when the ethnos is established does the social mind begin to act chiefly and powerfully on the social constitution, and thereby to organize and develop the demos.

It follows, as was pointed out in an earlier chapter, that a study of social composition is nearly co-extensive with ethnogenic sociology, and that ethnogenic sociology is mainly a study of the evolution of the social composition, though incidentally it is necessary to follow many associated developments of the social constitution.

I shall not at this time go further into the detail of the study of the social composition, the most important questions of which are those of the origins and early forms of

the family and of the clan, and of their relations to each other and to the tribe. Much less shall I enter here upon a particular study of the social constitution. I wish, however, to say a further word in regard to the limits of this part of sociological theory.

In the study of institutions, more than anywhere else, general sociology has been confounded with the special social sciences. Nearly every writer on sociology makes the mistake of thinking that symmetry and completeness are to be secured by taking up for separate discussion each group of social institutions in turn. By this erroneous judgment, or more truly this lack of insight, he not only places himself in a position where he must be either omniscient or superficial, but he disintegrates his science. Instead of unfolding an organic sociology he binds together in the covers of one book the elements of several social sciences. The general sociologist has nothing to do with the details of the evolution of institutions of any kind, domestic, political or ecclesiastical. His business is to lay a firm foundation in social psychology on which the students of institutions can build. He should show how the social mind works in creating institutions of any kind or of all kinds. He should show in what order the different kinds of institutions appear, as determined by their genetic relationships, and how all institutions vary in their vigor and characteristics with varying aspects of the social mind. These are fundamental studies, the results of which the student of any particular group of institutions should have at command without being obliged to work them out for himself, just as the anatomist or the physiologist depends on general biology for such postulates as the laws of selection, adaptation and heredity. They are also quite numerous enough for one division of one science. To add to them the details of several others is to misconceive the theoretical structure no less than the practical limits of sociology.

CHAPTER V.

THE SECONDARY PROBLEMS: SOCIAL PROCESS, LAW AND CAUSE.

My present account of the secondary sociological problems will be even more summary and more merely-indicative than that of the primary problems has been. The full discussion I reserve for a larger work. I shall only state the problems and barely suggest the answers that I expect further study to establish. The questions are those of the fact and nature of progress, of the nature of the social process, of the reality of social law and the character of social causation, and of the organic nature and function of society.

What have we to say about progress? Comte identified progress with social dynamics, and set it over against social statics. Social statics was a theory of social order; social dynamics he conceived to be a theory of stages of human development, and his discussion of progress, therefore, became merely a philosophy of history. The theories of organic evolution have thrown discredit on that way of conceiving the world which led to a sharp separation of static and dynamic in exposition, and Mr. Spencer, after having in his younger days published a book on "Social Statics," has in his later writings avoided any such line of division. Structures and forces are exhibited together, structure giving lines of direction to motion, motion, nevertheless, modifying structure. Yet without abandoning the organic conception, one may give his attention chiefly to the structural relations, or chiefly to the modifying forces as Mr. Ward has done in his treatise on "Dynamic Sociology." It follows that if progress be identified with the dynamic aspect of social life, a work on sociology will either contain no separate discussion of progress, or be little else than such a discussion, according to the author's personal bias. But the identity must not be uncritically assumed. A complete theory of social dynamics

would be an account of all social forces and of all possible social changes. Does our idea of progress include all social changes? Does it not rather exclude very rigorously all except changes of certain definable kinds, or in certain well-marked directions? If so, a doctrine of progress is far enough from being co-extensive, or in any other way identical, with social dynamics. It is rather a theory of the conditions under which social elements and forces emerge in a particular result, and therefore, also, of the limits to that kind or mode of change which the conditions impose. Otherwise stated, a philosophy of progress is primarily a theory of conditions and only incidentally of the forces that act subject to the conditions, while social dynamics is primarily a theory of forces and only incidentally of conditions. The point is technical, but helpful for clear thinking.

It would appear, therefore, that the first task in the study of progress must be to ascertain in what sense there is any such thing. What is the fact of progress? In what does it consist? If it is a group of changes of a particular and verifiable kind, its conditions can be known and its limits determined, at least approximately.

The answer of sociology will be that progress includes an increase of material well-being, a development of the social nature, and an increasingly perfect organization of social structure, but that, essentially, it is none of these things. Essentially it is a conversion of lower modes of energy into higher, that is, more complexly organized modes, and a substitution of the psychical for the physical process in social phenomena. It is an evolution of intelligence and sympathy, not merely as qualities or states of individual consciousness, but as gigantic social forces which more and more dominate social development, subordinating the relations of physical compulsion, in which society begins, to a voluntary co-operation. Society does not begin in contract but it tends progressively towards contract.* So conceiving

* This topic is admirably handled by Fouillée, "*La Science Sociale Contemporaine*."

progress, the sociologist will prove that it has certain rather definite limits. The conversion of physical into psychical energy cannot proceed beyond a definite degree of rapidity without endangering social organization.*

If such are the nature and conditions of progress we have discovered the significant characteristic of the social process. It is the progressively important part played by the psychical forces. If it is chiefly, though not altogether, the physical aspect of social phenomena and a process of physical causation that we study when we look at the origins of social structure and growth, it is the conscious phenomena and a psychical process to which we pass when we turn to the later evolution. In all the higher forms of association and concerted action human wills are a factor. Association is no longer fortuitous, it is volitional. It follows that in studying volitional association we have to do especially with the connection between social forms and various sorts of co-operation, and the purposes that they fulfill, since men do not, of deliberate will, maintain and perfect their social relations unless they are conscious of an end to be subserved. That end is the development of their own psychical life, in scope and power and happiness. So the questions of volitional association are immediately concerned with the relation between social evolution and the development of personality. They include an analysis of the phases that volitional association presents for examination, such as its cohesive strength, its duration and the manner of its co-ordination. They include all inquiries that may be made as to the functional or purposive side of association, that is to say, the ways in which association acts favorably on individual personality and on the social mind, and likewise all inquiries as to the action of the social mind in creating custom, institutions and positive law. Inexhaustible materials are at hand for the student pursuing these inquiries. To exhibit the phases

* I have examined this phase of the question more fully in an article on "The Ethics of Social Progress," published first in the *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. III, No. 2, January, 1893, and reprinted in a volume of essays by various writers, on "Philanthropy and Social Progress," Boston, 1893.

of association, for example, the phenomena of political majorities alone would be sufficient, showing, as they do, every degree of cohesion,—from the rigorous party discipline that is able to defy independent movements and to sneer at all reformers, down to alliances that vanish at the first breath of dissension,—and every agency of co-ordination, from the “pull” of a district “boss” to the welding heat of moral indignation.

Conscious personality acts upon society through choice, and if there is a law of the volitional process in society it must be, as was shown in the first chapter, a law of social choices. We have come now to the point where an attempt to formulate the law must be made.

That it has not been made before this; that the very possibility of such a law has hardly been suspected, is in no way remarkable, because the sociologists who have been more interested in the volitional than in the physical aspect of social evolution have not been familiar, apparently, with the theory of individual choice that has been elaborated in modern economics. That the construction of this theory, the first scientific attempt to explain choice that has been made at all, in any department of knowledge, should have been the work of economists rather than of psychologists is perhaps remarkable, but no well-informed person will deny the fact.

Individual choices are determined by the subjective values previously described. Now in making subjective valuations for practical purposes we cannot estimate each source or means of satisfaction by itself alone; we can do that only in theory, for the sake of analysis. In real life we have to ask how each possible enjoyment will combine with other possible enjoyments to make up a total of happiness. We have to tone down or modify some indulgences to make them combine well with others, or, failing to do that, we have to sacrifice some pleasures altogether. As a rule many moderate pleasures that combine well, each heightening the others, will make up a larger total of satisfaction than a few

pleasures each of which is more intense. It is necessary therefore to correct each subjective value, as individually considered, by reference to its probable relation to other values.

Again, in subjective value immediate pleasure is not necessarily the only element considered. Further corrections may be made for probable future pleasures and pains, resulting from the choice contemplated, and for reactions on the personality, the self-development and the self-activity, of the chooser.

As soon as intellectual power sufficient to make such corrections has been acquired, the individual will attempt to bring his subjective values into a consistent whole, but the composition of the whole, and his success in making it harmonious throughout, will depend very much upon his own experiences. If his experiences have been limited and narrow and his pleasures few, but often repeated, his consciousness will have become identified with a total of subjective values that is thoroughly self-consistent, as far as it goes, but is very simple in its make-up. His few pleasures will be relatively intense; he will carry the consumption of each sort of goods that he uses to a further limit than he would carry it to if his pleasures were varied.

Suppose, now, that some wholly new pleasure, more intense than any that he has enjoyed hitherto, is introduced into his life, or that suddenly he sees opened to him possibilities of many new pleasures, which are, however, more or less incompatible with those to which he has been used. His group of subjective values becomes at once larger and more complex than before, but also less well-organized. It will be a long time before the readjustment is made. It will involve many sacrifices and self-denials. Meanwhile, the chances are that he will choose crudely and in a radical fashion. He will substitute oftener than he will combine. He will destroy when he might conserve. He will go wholly over to the new way of life, enjoying as before a few pleasures intensely instead of learning that he might get a

greater total of satisfaction from a large number of lesser pleasures harmoniously put together.*

Apply these principles now to a population. Make a population-map of a country like the United States, showing the distribution of the people according to their habitual pleasures. In one region you will find a marked predominance of those who have lived for generations in a circumscribed way, the people of narrow experiences and of few enjoyments. In another region you will find in large numbers those who have suddenly found themselves face to face with possibilities of which they had not dreamed. Elsewhere you will find those who have so long enjoyed varied experiences and manifold pleasures that their subjective values make up totals which are highly complex and yet, at the same time, harmonious. Can predictions be made as to how these different regions will choose, select, or decide in their industry, their law-making, their educational and religious undertakings, their organization of institutions? I think that, beyond any doubt, prediction is possible, and that the law of social choice can be formulated, as follows :

A population enjoying few and relatively intense pleasures, harmoniously combined, will be conservative in its choices. A population having varied, but as yet inharmoniously combined, pleasures, will be radical in its choices. Only the population that enjoys many, varied, not over-intense, but harmoniously combined pleasures, will be consistently progressive in its choices.†

If this is the law of social choices, what determines the persistence of choices? The social arrangements that we

* For the most complete discussion of these topics, the reader is referred to the writings of Professor Simon N. Patten; especially, "The Consumption of Wealth," Philadelphia, 1889; "The Theory of Dynamic Economics," Philadelphia, 1892; and "The Economic Causes of Moral Progress," ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE, Vol. III, p. 129, September, 1892.

† I believe that this law can be successfully applied to political prediction as soon as we have detailed sociological descriptions of populations. I have indicated some of the possibilities in an article on "The Nature and Conduct of Political Majorities," published in the *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. VII, No. 1, March, 1892.

know at present are survivals. Thousands of different arrangements have disappeared because their usefulness to man was transient or feeble. They did not sufficiently profit the tribes or peoples that used them to save either people or institutions from extinction. The social arrangements that live as a part of the life of virile communities are arrangements that make communities virile. Directly or indirectly they help to make a better social man, keener in mind and more adept in co-operation. But among all possible social choices in law and institution-making, what ones will contribute to these results? What choices, merely as choices, will natural selection prefer?

The answer that sociology will give, I think, is very certain. The law is unmistakable. Those subjective values will survive, which are component parts in a total, or whole, of subjective values that is becoming ever more complex through the inclusion of new tastes and new pleasures and, at the same time, more thoroughly harmonious and coherent.

This law does not express a psychical process, as does the law of social choices. It formulates objective, physical conditions, to which choice must in the long run conform. When once the conditions are clearly perceived the law becomes entirely comprehensible.

Society, like the individual, must adjust itself to a physical environment. Its pleasures, laws and institutions must be a part of the adjustment, and thoroughly consistent with it, as a whole. But the environment is no constant or unchanging group of relations. It is undergoing ceaseless evolution, though the changes are often too slow to be perceptible at the moment. It is becoming more and more diversified through differentiation. Society may increase the diversification, but cannot prevent it. It cannot make the conditions to which life must adapt itself more simple. On the contrary, life must become more complex, by adaptation to more complex conditions, or it must cease. This, then, is the reason why tastes must become more varied. It is the reason why pleasures must be many, and contributory

to one another, each heightening, softening, or coloring the others, till all are like musical notes in accord. It is the reason further, why our principal and familiar enjoyments must not be so intense, individually, as to exclude those weaker, rarer, and more refined pleasures that are necessary constituents in a perfect whole of maximum satisfaction. Therefore it is in the physical nature of things that ultra-conservative and ultra-radical social choices must in the long run get extinguished, and that only the moderately but constantly progressive choices can survive.

Are we then to conclude that, in the last analysis, social causation is an objective or physical process, notwithstanding the important part that has been assigned to volition? If by this question is meant the metaphysical inquiry whether mind is merely a manifestation of matter, the sociologist as such has no opinion about it to offer. As sociologist that troublesome puzzle does not concern him. But if the question is whether the volitional process in society is conditioned by the physical, and is in no way independent, or underived, the sociologist must make an affirmative reply.

The part played by the volitional factors in social evolution is so conspicuous that a student who approaches the problem from one side only can easily fall into the habit of thinking of them as underived, independent causes, and out of this unscientific habit many misconceptions have grown. The sociologist deals with phenomena of volition at every step. In fact, as we have seen, they are central points, about which all the other phases of social change are grouped. More than this; the sociologist deals not only with causes that are not merely physical, but with many that are not merely psychical. They are as much more complex than the merely psychical as the psychical are more complex than the merely physical. They are sociological—products of social evolution itself—and the true sociologist wastes no time on attempts to explain all that is human by environment apart from history.

The real question, therefore, is not on the existence or the importance of volitional and distinctively sociological causes. It is whether these are underived from simpler phenomena than themselves, and undetermined by processes of the physical and organic world. To this question the answer of sociology is an unqualified negative. Sociology is planted squarely on those new conceptions of nature—natural causation and natural law—that have grown up in scientific minds in connection with doctrines of evolution and the conservation of energy.* These conceptions, as the working hypotheses of physical and organic science, are totally unlike those old metempirical notions that made natural law an entity, endowed it with omnipotence, and set it up in a world of men and things to govern them. Natural laws are simply unchanging relations among forces, be they physical, psychical or social. A natural cause is simply one that is at the same time an effect. In the universe as known to science there are no independent, unrelated, uncaused causes. By natural causation, therefore, the scientific man means a process in which every cause is itself an effect of antecedent causes; in which every action is at the same time a reaction. Nature is but the totality of related things, in which every change has been caused by antecedent change and will itself cause subsequent change, and in which, among all changes, there are relations of coexistence and sequence that are themselves unchanging.

In this mighty but exquisite system man is indeed a variable, but not an independent variable. He is a function of innumerable variables. In a world of endless change he acts upon that world, but only because he is of that world. His volition is a true cause, but only because it is a true effect. Therefore, while affirming the reality of sociological forces that are distinctly different from merely biological and merely physical forces, the sociologist is careful to add that

* Conceptions not all found even in so recent a work as the "Logic" of J. S. Mill, but set forth clearly by Lewes, in "Problems of Life and Mind." First Series.

they are different only as products are different from factors; only as protoplasm is different from certain quantities of oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen and carbon; only as an organism and its co-ordinated activities are different from a group of nucleated cells having activities that are unrelated. Recognizing that society is an organization that acts in definite ways upon its members, he looks beyond the superficial aspect and finds that all social action is in fact a reaction, and, as such, definitely limited and conditioned. He finds nowhere a social force that has not been evolved in a physical-organic process, nor one that is not at every moment conditioned by physical facts. He sees in constant operation that marvelous product of individual wills, the collective or group will, in which Austin found the source of political sovereignty; but he sees also, what no jurist before Darwin's day could know, how inexorably the sovereign will is conditioned by natural selection. The group, like the individual, can will what it wills; but what it does will is determined by conditions that man did not create, and whether the group will keep on willing this thing or that thing, will depend on whether the thing willed conduces to social survival. If it does not, there is presently an end of social willing along those lines.

It is in this truth that the sociologist discerns the essential significance of the much-befogged doctrine of natural rights. Natural rights, as the term was once understood, have gone to the limbo of outworn creeds; not so those natural norms of positive right that sociology is just beginning to disclose. Legal rights are rights sanctioned by the law-making power; moral rights are rules of right sanctioned by the conscience of the community; natural rights are socially-necessary norms of right, enforced by natural selection operating in the sphere of social relations; and in the long run there can be neither legal nor moral rights not grounded in natural rights as thus defined.

I am not trying here to rehabilitate an old idea in a new phraseology. I reject the old idea, and with it that use of the

word natural, imposed on political philosophy by Rousseau, which identifies the natural exclusively with the primitive; a use now banished from biology and psychology, but inexcusably retained in the political sciences by many economists and jurists, as if natural were a word of no broader meaning than natal. In scientific nomenclature natural has become much more nearly identical with normal. In its absolute scientific sense the natural is that which exists in virtue of its part in a cosmic system of mutually-determining activities; hence, in a relative and narrower sense it is that which is, on the whole, in harmony with the conditions of its existence. The unnatural is on the way to dissolution or extinction.

If the social will is conditioned by natural selection, not less is the power to convert will into deed conditioned by the conservation of energy. Enormous as the social energy is, it is at any moment a definite quantity. Every unit of it has been taken up from the physical environment, and no transmutations of form can increase the amount. What is used in one way is absolutely withdrawn from other modes of expenditure. Let the available energies of the environment be wasted or in any way diminished, the social activity must diminish too. The evolution of new relationships of conscious association, and the accompanying development of personality, will be checked.

Thus our definition of sociology as an explanation of social phenomena in terms of natural causation, becomes somewhat more explicit. Specifically, it is an interpretation in terms of psychical activity, organic adjustment, natural selection and conservation of energy. As such, it may be less than a demonstrative science, if the experimental sciences be taken as the standard; but we cannot admit that it is only a descriptive science, as contended by those French sociologists who hold closely to the philosophy of Comte.* It is strictly an explanatory science, fortifying induction by deduction, and referring effects to veritable causes.

* See especially M. de Roberty "*La Sociologie*," second edition. Paris, 1886, Chapter II.

Moreover, when rightly apprehended, sociology has a perfect scientific unity. The conceptions here presented transcend the old Comtist division into two sharply defined parts, before mentioned, one dealing with social statics, the other with social dynamics.* Structure can no longer be studied in any organic science apart from function, nor function apart from structure, for we know that at every stage activity determines form; and form, activity. The sociologist refuses to sunder in theory what nature has joined in fact. He centres his attention on a moving equilibrium.

The final question remains. What is the nature of this concrete group of phenomena that we have been studying? To what class of natural objects does it belong? Is it, as Mr. Spencer and others have said, an organism?

Certainly it is not a physical organism. Its parts, if parts it has, are psychical relations. They are not held together by material bonds, but by comprehension, sympathy and interest. If society is an organism at all it must be described as physio-psychic—a psychical organism essentially, but having a physical basis. But the reader who has followed these pages thus far will be disposed to agree with me, I think, that a society is more than an organism—something as much higher and more complex as an organism is higher than non-living matter. A society is an *organization*, partly a product of unconscious evolution, partly a result of conscious planning. An organization is a complex of psychical relations. Like an organism, however, it may exhibit every phase of evolution—of differentiation with increasing cohesion or unity.

Like an organism, too, an organization may have a function, and society unmistakably has one. It has developed conscious life; it is creating human personality, and to that end it now exists. It is conscious association with his fellows that develops man's moral nature. To the exchange of thought and feeling all literature and philosophy, all

* A division carried out by M. de Roberty in the classification of the special social sciences.—“*La Sociologie*,” p. 113.

religious consciousness and public polity, are due, and it is the reaction of literature and philosophy, of worship and polity, on the mind of each new generation that develops its type of personality. Accordingly, we may say that the function of social organization, which the sociologist must keep persistently in view, is the evolution of personality, through ever higher stages and broader ranges, into that wide inclusion and to that high ideal quality that we name humanity.

Therefore, at every step the sociological task is the double one—to know how social relations are evolved, and how, being evolved, they react on the development of personality.* Put in yet another way we may say that one object of sociology is to learn all that can be learned about the creation of *the social man*. The bearing of this learning upon the studies of the economist and the political theorist will be well understood by all who have followed the recent progress of political philosophy. The “economic man” of the Ricardians still lives and has his useful work to do; *pace* our scientific Iagos, who aver that they have looked upon the world these four times seven years, and have never yet “found man that knew how to love himself.” Not so the natural man of Hobbes, whose singular state, as described in the *Leviathan*, “was a condition of war of every one against every one,” but who nevertheless “covenanted” with his neighbor. That whole class of ideas, and all the theories built upon them, in which man was lifted out of his social relations—in which the individual was conceived as an uncompromising egoist, existing prior to society and reluctantly bringing himself to join a social combination as a necessary evil—are giving way before a sounder knowledge. Instead of those notions, a conception of man as essentially and naturally social, as created by his social relationships and existing *qua* man only in virtue of them, will be the starting-point of the political theorizing of coming years.

* The work of interpreting thought, morals, art and religion from the sociological point of view had been hopefully begun by the lamented M. Guyau. His “*L'Art au Point de Vue Sociologique*” and “*Éducation et Hérité, étude sociologique*,” are especially suggestive.

CHAPTER VI.

THE METHODS OF SOCIOLOGY.

We come now, finally, to the question of the methods and mental habits that are required in sociological research. Is it possible to find under the actual conditions of university life, the mental qualities and to develop the methods that must be relied on? Indeed, are we not confronted here with a very serious, perhaps an insuperable difficulty? The specializing tendencies of modern research are due quite as much to mental limitations as to the distinctness of the inquiries pursued. I am not sure that this subjective fact, rather than any objective feature, is not more and more determining the grouping or classification of the sciences for university purposes. Subjects are grouped together in schools or departments that call for the same or similar aptitudes, and are pursued by the same or similar methods. If, then, a science is allied by its subject-matter with knowledge of one kind while its method is necessarily one by which we discover knowledge of a very different kind, its chances of winning the favor of students are small. If sociology is of interest chiefly to students of the economic, political and moral sciences, but must be developed by methods with which they are little familiar, any hope of establishing it securely as a university study might as well be abandoned. Of course we may premise that the successful pursuit of any modern science requires a fairly broad range of intellectual sympathies. Every science is in some measure dependent on many other sciences for both concepts and methods. Its devotees cannot be wholly unfamiliar with the instruments or modes of reasoning employed by their co-workers in other fields. Yet every science has also a method or methods that are peculiarly its own and are mastered only through systematic training. Sociology is no exception. It draws largely from biology, largely also

from history. Statistics it uses so freely that many writers hold it to be an open question whether sociology and statistics are anything else than different names for the same science, or, at the most, slightly different forms of what is practically the same body of knowledge. Yet if I have rightly stated the problems of sociology, all these means of research are subordinate. The chief dependence must be on a skillful employment of psychological synthesis. Using the faculty of scientific imagination, the sociologist must ideally put together the various elements, forces, laws, of psychical life; and then bring the whole result, as an organic unity, to the test of comparison with historical facts and statistical tabulations. His procedure must not only reverse the processes of ordinary psychology, by which that concrete whole, the individual *ego*, is resolved into hypothetical elements and modes of activity; it must likewise reverse a radically unscientific procedure that for years has obtained in the political sciences. After resolving human nature into abstractions, we have attempted to verify, *singly and severally*, all manner of deductions therefrom by a direct comparison with statistics and history, as if these concretes could by any possibility correspond to deductive truths until the latter had been wrought together into complex wholes. Of a score of illustrations that might be cited, take the once familiar economic dogma, that if a laborer does not pursue his interest, his interest will none the less pursue him, against which President Walker has so effectively marshaled the concrete facts of industrial life. Filled with indignation at the mischief which that dogma has done, we have said too hastily that all deductive economics is a lie. For that very dogma, as a single abstract truth, was a valid scientific conclusion; because it is certainly legitimate to separate an abstract principle of human nature from all other abstract principles and to draw logical deductions from it. The fallacy entered when the single truth was taken for a synthesis of truths; when the part was made to do duty for the whole. If besides the premise that man may

be abstractly conceived as a competitor with his fellow-men for economic advantage, the economists had made use of the further premise that we may also abstractly conceive of him as an instinctive combiner with his fellow-man for maintaining class power and privilege, they would have drawn not only the deduction that employers must compete with one another in building up industries, but the further deduction that, as far as possible, they will refrain from competing against one another in buying labor, and will never fail to stand together in shaping the social and legal conditions under which laborers must sell their work. The two deductions put together would have afforded a resultant truth not very unlike the concrete facts of history and statistics. Working by the method of psychological synthesis, the sociologist is constantly on the watch for neglected or unperceived factors in human action, as the chemist for undiscovered elements, and by putting them together in every imaginable way he tries to discover the conditions and laws of their combination. Regarded on its disciplinary side, sociology is pre-eminently the science that may be expected to train its students in habits of constant attention to the psychical possibilities of the great world of human struggle, in which we act and suffer and enjoy.

Viewing the science and its method in this way, I do not hesitate now to give an affirmative answer to the question whether students of the political sciences can be expected to master the method that has been described. I am prepared even to go further, and to affirm that there is no other one thing in the whole range of their possible studies which it is so imperatively necessary that they should master. The young man who is to-day entering upon the special researches of economics or public law will quickly discover that he must become a very critical observer of the psychological assumptions underlying those sciences if he expects to keep pace with their future progress. The prolonged controversy over the respective merits of deductive and historical methods is approaching an issue that no one

foresaw. I think no one will contradict me if I say that the men who, a dozen or fifteen years ago, expected almost unlimited additions to knowledge from the application of historical researches to political and economic questions, have been not a little disappointed. There is an unmistakable reaction all along the line toward the freer employment of analysis and deduction. But these methods can never again be used in quite the old way. It is seen by everybody that the basis of investigation must be widened; that innumerable facts must be taken into account that were once ignored. Is it not significant that while this conclusion has been slowly forcing itself upon scientific attention, a new life has been actually infused into theoretical studies by men who have approached them from the psychological side? Without raising any question of the final value of the contributions made to economic theory by Jevons and Menger and their followers, I think we must all admit that we owe to their re-examination of the psychological premises of political economy the fresh impulse that is making itself felt in every department of economic speculation. Much the same sort of thing may be affirmed of comparative jurisprudence. Five years ago one would have said that the doctrine of natural rights was buried beyond resurrection. Yet of late it has been again discussed on both sides of the Atlantic with more originality and more vigor than at any previous time since the closing days of the eighteenth century. But here again the new view is not like the old. Historical researches having shown the essential relativity of all systems of right, the inquiry is now as to the subjective or psychological basis of the historical systems. No doubt the doctrine that will emerge will be very unlike the eighteenth century notions, but, be that as it may, the conviction is gaining ground that the further progress of the sciences of public law will depend greatly on a more thorough study of the psychology of law. And public law and economics are but two out of many sciences that are grounded in social psychology. They all build on psychological assumptions, and

the assumptions are either true or imaginary. The phantasms and symbols of an imaginary psychology have ruled the social sciences long enough. Whether we like it or not we must now throw over our illusions and learn to substitute for them the truths of a rational sociology.